

Globalisation and Environmental Resistance Politics

Author(s): James H. Mittelman

Source: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 5 (Dec., 1998), pp. 847-872

Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992934>

Accessed: 31-03-2020 16:21 UTC

## REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992934?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992934?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents)

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

---

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

*Taylor & Francis, Ltd.* is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Third World Quarterly*



# Globalisation and environmental resistance politics

JAMES H MITTELMAN

*ABSTRACT* Based on extensive fieldwork in Eastern Asia, an epicentre of globalisation, and Southern Africa, a key node in the most marginalised continent, this cross-regional study asks: what constitutes resistance to neo-liberal globalisation? An ecological reading of master theorists of resistance, especially Polanyi, focuses attention on protectionist movements as a response to the spread and deepening of the market—solid patterns and cumulative action—and to a lesser degree, on the soft, or latent, forms of protest that may or may not sufficiently harden so as eventually to challenge globalising structures. Attention is given to submerged forms of resistance within civil society insofar as they are emerging into networks. The empirical evidence includes interviews designed to elicit the voices of the subjects of globalisation engaged in environmental resistance politics. Counter-globalisation strategies are identified, and the impact of countervailing forces is assessed.

Not all types of environmental degradation are of recent origin or global in scope—some are long established and local.<sup>1</sup> Even so, unsustainable transformation of the environment under globalisation differs from environmental damage in previous epochs. Although contemporary environmental abuses have harmed their antecedents in earlier periods of history, globalisation coincides with new environmental problems such as global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, acute loss of biodiversity, and forms of transborder pollution (eg acid rain). These problems have emerged not singly but together. Moreover, some ecological problems are clearly the result of global crossborder flows, as with certain kinds of groundwater contamination, leaching, and long-term health threats traceable to importing hazardous wastes.

Large-scale growth in world economic output since the 1970s has not only quickened the breakdown of the global resource base, but also has upset the planet's regenerative system, including its equilibrium among different forms of life and their support structures. A large part of the explanation is that deregulation and liberalisation mean more global pressure to lower environmental standards, although there are of course counterpressures to shift from environmentally destructive activities to cleaner technologies. In the absence of stringent regulations and effective enforcement mechanisms, fear and insecurity about the planet's future are on the rise.

With hypercompetition for profits, the market is breaching nature's limits.<sup>2</sup>

James H Mittelman is at the School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016-8071, USA; e-mail: <jmittel@american.edu >.

Yet nature's protest, its signals of breakdown, provide an opening. Rather than reify the environment, it is important to resist the ontological distinction between humans and nature, a dualism rooted in modern thought since Descartes. By resisting this distinction, humankind and nature may be viewed interactively as 'a single causal stream'.<sup>3</sup> The environment may then be understood as political space, a critical venue where civil society is voicing its concerns. As such, the environment represents a marker where, to varying degrees, popular resistance to globalisation is manifest. Slicing across party, class, religion, gender, race and ethnicity, environmental politics offers a useful entry point for assessing counter-globalisation.

Accordingly, the questions that frame this article are: what are the specific sites of environmental resistance to globalisation? Who are the agents of resistance? What strategies are adopted? And to what extent are they localised or regionalised and globalised? In other words, is there evidence to demonstrate the stirrings of counter-globalisation?

In attempting to answer these questions, I will show the complex layering of different modes of resistance politics. My chief concern is organised environmental responses to globalisation, though not to the exclusion of other types of resistance. For reasons that will be elaborated in the next section, I am especially interested in direct environmental initiatives—solid patterns and cumulative action—but also in the soft, or latent, forms of protest that may or may not sufficiently harden so as eventually to challenge global structures. Attention will be given to submerged forms of resistance insofar as they are emerging into networks. Networks are important partly because they may serve as venues for resistance and also because global capitalism is not at all singular.<sup>4</sup> Rather, capitalism is organised in multiple ways. For example, 'network capitalism' is widely recognised in the Japanese and transnational Chinese forms of ties originating at university and continuing in professional circles, information exchange and government–business collaboration.

A major goal of this article then is to present evidence for exploring the politics of resistance (in view of theoretical propositions developed elsewhere).<sup>5</sup> The objective is to bring to light the diversity of environmental politics in encounters with globalising processes. The evidential material adduced here illustrates the myriad ways that environmental groups operate, and offers fresh and original examples of emerging and varying consciousness of resistance. For the purposes of scholarly research, it would be desirable to separate the domain of resistance to globalisation from resistance to other forms of hierarchical power relations, but they cannot be neatly divided. Rather, spheres of resistance surrounding the environment, labour standards, women's issues, human rights, etc merge and interpenetrate. One can, however, identify certain emphases in consciousness and action as a basis for analysing potential transformations in world order.

This article considers but in no way romanticises the voices of the subjects of globalisation who are engaged in environmental resistance politics. Not limited to perceptual evidence, it draws on both documentary research and 75 separate interviews (some for attribution and others on condition of anonymity) that I conducted in Eastern Asia and Southern Africa.<sup>6</sup> I say 'separate' because in

some cases, and to my pleasant surprise, more than one member of an organisation unexpectedly turned up for an appointment with a single interviewee and participated in what became a group interview. The interviewees were selected with reference to the categories deemed theoretically central, discussed below. In carrying out research in countries where civil society is of recent origin and relatively thin, I sought out the leading activists who are pursuing environmental objectives (though they may also mobilise around other causes pertaining to social justice) and challenging global structures either directly or indirectly. Of course, the proximate issues vary from one case to another—eg from deforestation to toxic waste—but in all instances involve transboundary problems.

It was of course impossible to hold interviews or do other types of fieldwork in all the countries in the two subregions, but this project did entail research of varied duration and intensity in Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, as well as in Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In the course of the research, I attended meetings of environmental resistance groups, accompanied them on their campaigns, including to a toxic waste dump (Holfontein, South Africa, July 20 1996), visited lands contested as ‘ancestral domain’ (a term used to underline the relationship between the issues of land rights and social justice), and queried ministers and a high court justice. Thus, I had ample opportunity to talk formally and informally with people in international and indigenous nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)<sup>7</sup>—including what are known as people’s organisations (POs) in the Philippines and community-based organisations (CBOs) in South Africa—businesses, state agencies, universities and the media. With most of the interviewees, it immediately became apparent that the architecture of globalisation is too huge to perceive as a whole, but if one moves to a finer scale, the structures become discernible.

To enter the crucible of resistance politics, I first explore the characteristics of environmental resistance politics. The next section turns to the sources of popular resistance, followed by a discussion of the agents challenging macrostructures. Inquiry then focuses on the sites of resistance and, finally, weighs the efficacy of multilayered strategies.

### **Characteristics of environmental resistance politics**

The environment is not a single phenomenon, and, as implied above, may be viewed through different prisms: a series of interactions between the physical and human worlds; a site of resistance; and a social construction that is contested. In terms of the third approach, attitudes to nature are always changing, are bound to time and place, and initially reflect the dominant culture. In fact, the relationship between nature and culture has been rapidly and variously transformed around the world. This is not new, but technological innovations and hypercompetition accelerate the trend. Moreover, a hallmark of globalisation is the explosion of cultural pluralism, and some cultural conflicts linked to imbalances in power relations find expression in environmental ideologies, understood as systems of representation of a definite group or class.

A graphic example of the social construction of the environment is the

Eurocentric conservation ideology that developed in Southern Africa. In the mid-twentieth century, there emerged an extension of the colonial paradigm, a conservation ideology based on a wildlife-centred, preservationist approach that buttressed white privilege and power in the subcontinent.<sup>8</sup> The story of game and nature reserves in Southern Africa is embedded in the mythology surrounding Kruger National Park and symbolised by the portrayal of Paul Kruger as a visionary who championed wildlife protection. Environmental historians have deconstructed this romantic myth, showing that Kruger actually opposed stricter game protection laws and supported the legal right of whites to continue to hunt. But the icon of 'Paul Kruger's dream' was appropriated by the purveyors of an emergent Afrikaner nationalism and manipulated to gain the support of poor whites; it helped to unite opposed factions and classes in Afrikaner society in the post-World War I period. After 1948, the apartheid regime revived the Kruger wildlife, protectionist myth in an attempt not only to rouse patriotism, but also to gain international respectability for the pariah state among its critics overseas.<sup>9</sup>

Racial discrimination in the application of conservation policies such as stock culling forged anti-conservation attitudes. The marginalisation of blacks generated a negative attitude towards government decisions concerning the environment, which were seen as imposed by an unjust system that denied meaningful representation or participation to people who believed that they had a rightful claim to the land. Africans engaged in poaching withheld their services and lived clandestinely in the game reserves—all expressions of freedom of action. Popular resistance gave rise to initiatives such as the Native Farmers Association (NFA), the first black organisation in South Africa to record a formal environmental ethic and thereby contribute to a counter-ideology opposed to the culture of the Park as being white, pristine and scientific. The NFA, in fact, called for a paradigmatic shift towards socially responsive policies.<sup>10</sup> What many white South Africans and Westerners came to regard as a science—conservation and park, or more generally, environmental management—others came to interpret as a disguised form of resource control.

This illustration indicates that the environment may be construed as a set of alternative moral forces forming ideological representations. It demonstrates that submerged responses to environmental use (or abuse) may in turn be transformed into organised political resistance that props up its counter-ideologies. It also contains the basic categories of analysis used by master theorists of resistance. Elsewhere, Christine Chin and I have sought to explicate theories of resistance by critically examining competing conceptualisations:<sup>11</sup> resistance as counter-hegemony,<sup>12</sup> resistance as counter-movements,<sup>13</sup> and resistance as in-frapolitics.<sup>14</sup> Without revisiting that analysis here, I merely want to position myself within this triad so as to offer a way to explore environmental resistance politics.

Needless to say, all three frameworks have great explanatory power. Their merits do not require elaboration in this format, but a few critical comments are in order. A Marxist who subscribed to the view that class conflict is the motor of history, Gramsci differed from Marx in allowing considerable autonomy for consciousness, which helps to understand the cultural dimensions of resistance. Nonetheless, a drawback to Gramsci's two-pronged conceptualisation of wars of

movement and position is that, in both cases, the objective is to take control of state power. With globalisation, however, resistance may or may not target the state. If one of the roles of the state today is to provide the domestic economy with greater access to global capital, then the state is a part of the whole matrix of globalisation. To rotate the holders of state power may not alleviate the problems that ignited resistance in the first place. Accordingly, Gramsci's conceptualisation must be stretched to include other types of actors and different spaces in which, at the turn of the millennium, consciousness develops. To be sure, one may still profitably invoke Gramsci's formulations on changing power relations within civil society, and the dynamics of culture for building theory, to explain resistance to globalisation; however, Gramsci's own writings on civil society are fragmentary and sometimes incongruent.

Like Gramsci, Scott turns attention to the culture of resistance. His emphasis on 'infrapolitical' activities that range from footdragging, squatting, gossip and jokes to the formation of dissident subcultures offers a subtle way to probe everyday responses to globalising processes. Indeed, there are valuable empirical studies documenting the microrelations of encounters between local and global conditions. For example, Aihwa Ong details spirit possession episodes, when Malay factory women become violent and scream abuse as a symptom of their loss of autonomy at work.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, the limitation to Scott's probing of covert acts is that the wide gamut of forms of resistance he suggests is a catch-all. Not only are they highly diffuse, they also may make little overall impact on power relations. This problem in Scott's framework is revealed in the very first line of his 1990 book. The aphorism he selects to open it is an Ethiopian proverb: 'When the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and farts'. Yet, how much political impact does farting really have? How much effect do footdragging, squatting, gossip and other forms of uncoordinated resistance actually have on environmental problems such as global warming and deterioration of the ozone layer? Where is the evidence to demonstrate that countless microscopic activities will ultimately amount to a shift in macrostructures?<sup>16</sup>

Although, as Scott cautions, these acts, even when multiplied, may or may not coalesce to oppose authority structures or topple regimes, they often signal weaknesses in a regime's legitimacy and can help undermine faith in authority. Indeed, it might be argued that numerous subversive measures do add up, for they are cumulative. But it seems fair to ask, if the consequences are fully felt only in the *longue durée*, how long will that be? As the eruption of multiple environmental crises patently shows, nature is already voiding its subordination to the market economy.<sup>17</sup> By all indications, it will not wait for the *longue durée* to resolve the matter. Whereas it is right to be alert to the subtexts of resistance, and thus the seeds of potential transformation, the question is: how and under what conditions do submerged forms of resistance coalesce and genuinely contest globalising structures? Conversely, it is important to specify the conditions that prevent the crystallisation of resistance politics. What factors facilitate and hinder the stiffening of resistance?

Few contemporary scholars (with notable exceptions<sup>18</sup>) have attempted to theorise the connections between social movements and world politics. It should

be recalled that master thinkers such as Gramsci and Polanyi offered traces of a finely grained analysis of the emergence of social movements within the global political economy of their times. Turning attention to the Owenites and Chartists of his day, Polanyi underlined that 'both movements comprised hundreds of thousands of craftsmen and artisans, labourers and working people, and with their vast following ranked among the biggest *social movements* in modern history'.<sup>19</sup> It was Polanyi's insight that the dialectic of movement and countermovement advances understanding of resistance. He remained steadfast in emphasising the role that concrete political, economic and social institutions play in historical transformation. Polanyi was above all concerned with the specific institutional arrangements by which particular societies ensure their livelihood. Following from Polanyi's contribution, an area of inquiry that needs to be extended is: as societies try to protect themselves against the traumatic effects of the market, including what he regarded as 'the disintegration of the cultural environment',<sup>20</sup> how do submerged expressions of resistance solidify and actually take shape as countermovements? In this vein, a Polanyian framework may be readily applied to the relationship between political economy and ecology.<sup>21</sup> In fact, writing more than a half century ago, Polanyi himself registered grave concern over the disembeddedness of markets not only from society but also from nature.<sup>22</sup>

An ecological reading of Polanyi requires a grasp of his critique of classical political economy and liberalism. In opposition to Adam Smith's emphasis on individual economic gains over an appreciation for embeddedness in social relations, and in contrast to Smith's response to the Physiocrats' proclivity for agriculture, Polanyi held that it is an error to exclude nature from political economy. Similarly, he pronounced Ricardo guilty of the commodity fiction of treating land only as a factor of production and detaching it from social institutions. Marx, too, came under fire for one-sidedly judging the character of an economy in terms of the labour process. According to Polanyi, always the economic historian and anthropologist, 19th-century society differed from its forerunners in the way that economic gain became pre-eminent in the organisation, or reorganisation of human life. For Polanyi, both Marxism and liberalism erroneously posited that the dominant pattern in their societies was dominant throughout history.<sup>23</sup> Adopting a wider, historical frame, Polanyi delimited forms of integration of humans and nature in pre-market society, and showed that the economy had been governed by basic institutions of society, and not vice versa. The institutional mechanisms had included reciprocity, redistribution and household relations.<sup>24</sup>

To extrapolate from Polanyi, the error of economic rationalism is to vest an economic culture with an economic logic. A science of economics subordinates the science of nature. This relationship turns on one's understanding of the 'economic', which cannot be taken for granted. One definition commonly used is formal, and centres on scarcity. It is to be distinguished from a second, the substantive sense, which involves 'the fundamental fact that human beings, like all other living things, cannot exist for any length of time without a physical environment that sustains them; this is the origin of the substantive definition of *economic*'.<sup>25</sup> The interactions between humans and their natural surroundings thus carry 'meanings', and there may be counteracting forces at work.

For a condition in which economics subordinates both nature and society, and hence creates market society, the antidote is re-embedding. But in practice, what does it really mean to reground economics in nature and social relations? Posing this question underscores the elemental dilemma in resistance politics today. The challenge is even greater than in Polanyi's time—and requires an extension of his framework—because of the increasing integration of national economies. The search for a formula for re-embedding has clearly given rise to different political projects, and is a contested issue. To examine these projects, let us first identify sources of popular environmental resistance so that we can then delineate the work of agents for change, especially the politically organised wings of civil society. What must then be taken into account is whether these wings fall into any sort of formation.

### Forms and sources of popular environmental resistance

Forms of environmental degradation are diverse and have several root causes. The main problems pertain to the home environment, the workplace and nature, and are to be found in different sectors of the economy, especially energy, agriculture, mining and manufacturing. The sources have both objective and subjective dimensions, and may be mapped as a combination of factors:

- hypercompetition;
- social inequality and poverty;
- unsustainable levels of exploitation of resources;
- occupation of land and its conversion into commercial and industrial projects;
- migration and overcrowding;
- fears of displacement;
- debt structures, which in turn further resource exploitation;
- criminalising the customary use of resources (or a perception thereof) and a lack of accountability.

Rather than only speak of a list of discrete sources, one must also trace distinctive historical trajectories culminating in environmental abuse. These constitute interactive webs of social relations. Some of the sources noted above originated in the pre-globalisation periods, but globalisation intensifies these processes. There are also new forms of age-old problems such as debt. Consider, for example, the environmental impact of structural adjustment programmes. Greater austerity at home coupled with the need to meet heightened interest payments, required by international financial institutions, often result in more emphasis on the export of natural resources to earn foreign exchange. The exploitation of resources and big projects such as the construction of dams displace people. Most often, it is poor people who become internal migrants.<sup>26</sup> On Mindanao, the southern-most island in the Philippines, transnational corporations—for instance, big pineapple concerns such as Dole—have gained possession of lowlands, eroding the soil and driving peasant farmers upland. Amid a sharp conflict between lowlanders and uplanders, indigenous peoples—'tribal groups'—battle to protect their cultural integrity and 'ancestral domain'.



While not a mountainous terrain, the landscape of eastern Zimbabwe straddling the Mozambican border is the scene of a similar form of encounter. With Cargill, a transnational food processing conglomerate, controlling large tracts of land, and with the erosion of the soil, internal migration is on the rise. Ethnic groups, or subdivisions of them, are competing for resources and coming into conflict with one another. In this case, it is difficult to distinguish internal and international migration, for local peoples regularly cross the border with impunity. They do so partly to evade laws—for example, Zimbabwean rural dwellers drive elephants, which destroy crops, over the border into Mozambique, and kill them there. The attitude among these peasant farmers is that borders are a nuisance that interfere with both their livelihood and relations with kin, redound to the advantage of the well-to-do, and are another way that the political authorities seek to impose control. In this instance, the state is seen as constraining crossborder flows—of fish, ivory, meat, marijuana and spirits—rooted in culture and economy. From this perspective, borders are instruments of coercion and sites of conflict. Such visions are underpinned by divisions of labour and power at the national, regional and global levels. In both the Philippines and Zimbabwe, not only are there pressures on poor people to become migrants, but to survive, they must also destroy resources.

Hence the targets of environmental resistance may be direct and take on a tangible form, or they may be indirect in the sense of process. The issue, at bottom, is control: control of land, species, forests, marine life, labour and ideology. These aspects of control may be inscribed in law and enforced by the state. The resisters are ultimately motivated by the desire for access and, in varied measures, react against layers of structural power. One aspect of such opposition, increasingly apparent among different power positions, is the disjuncture between environmental ideologies.<sup>27</sup> Evident under varied guises in both Eastern Asia and Southern Africa is a clash between advocates of a modern-day, neoliberal variant of the trickle-down approach, which holds that the first task is to grow the economy and then one can attend to distribution and equity, and proponents of alternatives that emphasise the need for community-based development and the linkage between economic reform and social policy (eg ‘social forestry’). In other words, access to resources is reinforced or challenged by different ideologies; but the dominant one is reform understood as growth before equity. Although, from one interview to another, my interviewees’ terminology differed, this same point was made several times over. In a joint interview that centred on forestry, an interviewee punctuated it by proclaiming: ‘The root causes are in social structures reinforced by the development paradigm. The paradigm is the villain’.<sup>28</sup>

The resisters adopt time and space perspectives consonant with their own sense of dignity and interests, which today are a matter of sheer survival for many. The specific forms that reactions take turn on the type and degree of environmental abuse as well as the strategies available to the resisters.<sup>29</sup> The recourse may be outward in the sense of striking at an external phenomenon, inward in taking on local forms of control, or both inasmuch as layers of outsiders and insiders become so interwoven that structures of resistance seek to break down both of them in either a simultaneous or sequential manner.<sup>30</sup> This then begs the question: what are the sites at which agents resist globalising structures and craft alternative strategies?

### Sites of Resistance

With globalisation, politics is being redefined. Electoral politics is the conventional arena, but of course not the only one. In fact, state politics around the world is, in varying measures, losing legitimacy, as evidenced by low voter participation rates in countries such as the USA and disgruntlement, if not disgust, with leaders who do not—or cannot—lead. Politics beyond the parameters of the state is more fluid than it is within the state. Civil society transcending the state, if only in an incipient manner, is emerging as a major site of contestation and is where diverse groups seek to redefine politics, including its time–space dimensions.<sup>31</sup> In a Braudelian sense of time, shared mental frameworks, including paradigms, are shifting, and borders are being redrawn not only in a formal manner, but also in terms of real flows of capital, population, information, knowledge, technology and other products.

The concept of civil society has its roots in the European intellectual tradition, especially the Scottish Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, and Western political culture. As the idea is most often used in the West, civil society has Hegelian overtones. In this manner, it is regarded as that realm of associational life above the individual, or some would say the family, and below the state.<sup>32</sup> However, for many activists who seek to build an alternative order, this interpretation is contested and qualified. The concept is perhaps more in line with Gramsci's notion that 'between the economic structure and the state with its legislation and coercion stands civil society'.<sup>33</sup> The boundaries, however, are blurred and must be negotiated. From the way that groups represent themselves, civil society is both outside and inside the state. In other words, for Gramsci, the state itself, especially in its interactions with civil society, becomes a terrain of struggle. Indeed today some of the leaders of civil society occupy important positions in state agencies. This poses an ethical dilemma for the 'independent' organs of civil society.

The idea of civil society has been imported into the idiom of contemporary politics partially because of neoliberalism's lack of a philosophical dimension and also partly because of multiple signs of the disintegration of social order. The environmental scars that mark the late twentieth century are emblematic of this degeneration. In response to the state's unwillingness or inability to respond effectively to these signals, civil society may act as a watchdog, a switchboard of information, a testing ground of ideas and a voice for citizens. As a grassroots environmentalist in Mindanao, Philippines, bluntly said about the state: 'You cannot trust the government to do the work for environmental rehabilitation and conservation'. His environmental organisation, like others in civil society, attempts to ensure accountability, and exerts constant pressure in an effort to gain responsiveness to citizens' wants and needs. In counterbalancing the state, civil society is always reinventing and recasting itself. It is also riddled with tensions, but prospers with diversity<sup>34</sup> If so, the conflicts within civil society may help to promote democratisation.

The state–civil society complex varies dramatically from one context to another, and there are different kinds of civil society. In some cases, the state monopolises resources, but there are other permutations. In many parts of the

non-Western world, claims emerging from civil society were not a feature of political life before recent decades, and the idea was transported from the West. Aside from self-help societies and local charities, a dense web of private, associational life did not exist in Japan and most other areas outside the West before the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, it is generally absent in Vietnam today, where environmentalists work with a ministry but do not find scope for private initiatives outside the state. There is only a handful of Vietnamese environmental NGOs, each one small, based in Hanoi and lacking autonomy. Environmental groups also face severe constraints in Singapore and Malaysia, but the conditions differ and warrant a distinctive mix of strategies.

There have been tentative attempts by Singaporean environmentalists, a multiclass group but mainly professionals, administrators and managers, to open up political space and test the state's rhetoric about tolerance. Most notably, the Nature Society of Singapore (NSS), founded over 30 years ago as the Singapore branch of the Malayan Nature Society, has contested government policy within stringent parameters. Inasmuch as NGOs in Singapore are subject to restraining legislation such as the Societies Act and deregistration, which effectively bans their operations, as well as court proceedings, the NSS has represented its actions as 'constructive dialogue'. Comprised of about 2000 members, the NSS has engaged in letter-writing campaigns, designed a master plan for conservation and commissioned its own environmental impact assessments.<sup>35</sup> The NSS also takes the initiative and submits proposals to the government, even though most of them—99%—are rejected. The most extreme move involved enlisting up to 25 000 signatures for a petition and submitting it to the appropriate authority. A major constraint is that the NSS and Singapore's few other environmental groups, which are mainly involved in school activities, risk losing credibility with the state—and thus facing sanctions—if they work with NGOs in other countries. Apart from sharing information, there is little transnational collaboration. Even so, tussles over environmental projects have contributed to important changes in land use: converting 87 hectares zoned for an agro-technology park to a bird sanctuary at Sungei Buloh, shelving plans for a golf course at the Lower Pierce reserve catchment area, and the diversion of a proposed Mass Rapid Transit line so that it would not disrupt the natural habitat of bird life in Senoko.<sup>36</sup> Notwithstanding coercive rule and co-optation wrought by a postcolonial transformation from poverty to economic well-being, and despite a culture that values 'consensus', not dissent, clearly there are fledgling attempts to expand civil society and, however tenuously, to foster resistance.

As in Singapore, civil society in Malaysia is constrained by economic co-optation, draconian laws such as the Internal Security Act (a relic of colonialism that permits detention without trial), and intimidation against environmental activism, including Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's rhetoric about 'green imperialism'. The state requires NGO registration, controls access to the media and is dominated by one party, which not only penetrates deeply into society, but is also extremely shrewd in mixing coercion and consent (the ingredients of a hegemonic constellation, in Gramsci's sense, so long as the latter is the predominant element). The holders of state power have nipped off elements of checks and balances—eg by eroding the prerogatives of farmers

associations and other semi-autonomous structures in the rural areas. Ideological representations—issues of race, language and religion—have deflected attention from critical problems, including environmental degradation. Nevertheless, there have been bottom-up actions by environmentalists—mobilisation in *kampung* (villages) around acid pollution, protests over radioactive waste, residence issues concerning trees in Cheras, and logging blockades in Sarawak.<sup>37</sup> A handful of environmental organisations—including the Environmental Protection Society, the Malayan Nature Society, Sahabat Alam Malaysia, the Centre for Environment, Technology and Development, Malaysia as well as various consumer associations—have established space for low-key agitation and ‘critical collaboration’ with the government.

In contrast, a robust civil society has developed in countries such as the Philippines and South Africa, and there are vibrant activities elsewhere—for example, in Thailand and South Korea. In the Philippines and South Africa, highly politicised civil societies emerged in the context of mobilisation: in one case, through armed struggles against Spanish colonialism, US domination and martial rule, while, in the other, against the apartheid regime. Between the different kinds of civil society activities illustrated above, countries such as Zimbabwe are in an intermediate position: environmentalists and other activists push the limits but are ever mindful of the consequences of not respecting them. In all instances, the concrete institutions of civil society, specific to countries and regions, are crucial.

### The agents

The spectrum of environmental institutions does not form a continuum running left and right. Rather, the environmental movement may be likened to a broad tree with many branches and shoots of varying degrees of maturity. The thickness changes from the roots to the different sides and levels. With the thickening of civil society, its tree-like growth may still be more a matter of twigs than boughs.

In practice, this structure consists of several institutions such as churches, trade unions, the business sector, peasant associations and student groups that have participated, and often joined together, in rallying around environmental issues. All of these institutions are part of civil society. It is civil society that is the main vector in environmental resistance. Within civil society, there appear to be five layers of environmental resistance to globalisation. Without underestimating the silent struggle of poaching, killing animals, cutting fences, burning fields, etc, it is direct and organised action at these five levels that seems to have the greatest impact and bears the most potential for gaining momentum.

There are a host of international environmental organisations such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund that work closely with indigenous groups or have local affiliates under their aegis.<sup>38</sup> Most of the former are based in the West, and may or may not have the same agenda as their partners in the Third World.<sup>39</sup> In some cases, those on the ground express reservations about the discrepant priorities of external bodies. At the second level of generality come national coalitions or networks such as the Caucus

of Development NGO Networks, an umbrella organisation of 14 major development NGO networks in the Philippines. Its objective is to serve as a network of networks.<sup>40</sup> Together, these coalitions encompass nearly 3000 individual organisations. An important research need is to map these coalition structures. Essentially, this is a web-like realm of functionally specialised organisations that link many NGOs, associations, societies, and so on, as well as share a common agenda and set of priorities.

Third, individual NGOs at a national level play multiple roles. They are catalysts that strive to facilitate action, often by advocacy, mobilising resources, and providing expertise: skills in local administration, legal drafting, accounting and other forms of training, as well as research on specific issues. Swept up in transformations of their livelihoods and modes of existence, leaders of civil society are searching for an understanding of these conditions. In honing their mission and carrying out research, NGOs require, and indeed seek, analytical paradigms. Notions such as trickle-down economics, participatory development and community organising are all born out of paradigms. Yet, with globalisation more compelling explanations are sought, especially to help generate means of action.

Next, although the idiom varies from one region and country to another, grassroots organisations are engaged in the actual implementation of projects. POs and CBOs are grassroots organisations involved in collective action. They may or may not seek the assistance of NGOs. Finally, civil society also includes a large swath of unheard masses who are unorganised but not unconcerned citizens, for they too are stakeholders. They can be mobilised around issues of severe environmental degradation, and have been incited to join campaigns to block activities such as illegal logging and the dumping of toxic wastes. Religious leaders, from Catholic bishops to the *mufti*, have indeed implored their followers to stop ecological destruction. The influence of Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism and other religions runs deep in environmental resistance politics, but extends farther down in some contexts than in others.

The Church sometimes serves as an alternative power structure or helps to establish one. Hence in 1988, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines issued a signed pastoral letter that lamented the damage done to the forests, rivers and corals attributable to 'human greed and relentless drive of our plunder economy'. The bishops also praised the efforts of the local people of Bukidnon and Zamboanga del Sur who 'defended what remains of their forest with their own bodies', and urged the people to 'organise around local ecological issues'.<sup>41</sup> Through their sermons, parish priests have rallied the masses to self-organise and take action such as blocking illegal logging in the Philippine countryside. They have made moral and practical appeals, explaining that 'God created the trees, but the trees are being cut down'. In the Philippines, one priest even called on the people to revive their tradition of head-hunting, and this threat was used against the loggers and their collaborators in local government.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, Zimbabwean environmentalists draw on ancestral rights as well as entreat churchgoers that, if you cut a tree, you are cutting the body of Jesus Christ; and if you plant a tree, you are healing the body of Jesus Christ.<sup>43</sup>

In South Africa, Earthlife Africa has catalysed protest by unemployed and

working class people against the building of toxic waste dumps adjacent to black townships by arranging for blacks, in these communities many of them unemployed and with little formal education, to visit residents of other such townships near toxic dumps.<sup>44</sup> Not restricted to instances of environmental racism, which places a disproportionate burden on the most marginalised sector of the population, such cross-visits are used in the face of various environmental abuses in other poverty-stricken communities as well.

Drawing on different support bases of privileged and underprivileged elements, civil society cross cuts class structures, but the roots of the contemporary environmental movement, at least in the more economically advanced areas, are implanted in the privileged sector. Again, it is important to underscore the wide variation from one context to another. In Japan, for example, lawyers, some of them doing *pro bono* work in other countries in Eastern Asia, as well as intellectuals, have played a leading role in the environmental movement, although the middle classes and many working class people have mobilised around consumer issues. In some other Eastern Asian countries and throughout Southern Africa, environmental politics for the many is linked to matters of livelihood and thus social justice, not ecocentric causes—conserving nature for its own sake—as in parts of what is known as the developed world (though *eco-dhamma*, or Green Buddhism, in Thailand may be an exception).

Nowhere in my research was the link, or the impediments to linkage, between the environmental movement and class structure more apparent than in interviews with working class black South Africans. Pelelo Magane, a union organiser, noted that, although the black community faces multiple problems such as consumer waste, toxins, pollution and safety issues, there is a stigma to organising around environmental issues: “The environment is looked at as a liberal phenomenon that doesn’t interest working class people”.<sup>45</sup> In the wake of the anti-apartheid mobilisations around race, an implication of this statement is that the environment is the concern of those who can afford the luxury. Similarly, in the black townships adjacent to Cape Town, respondents emphasised the class barriers to organising around the environment, given the dire need for jobs, housing, health care and protection against crime. In Langa township, whose residents migrated there as a result of forced removals (a feature of the Group Areas Act), Tsoga, an environmental movement, encounters the perception that the environment is ‘a white thing’. Hence, in the view of its director, local people see but two worlds—‘the advantaged and the disadvantaged’.<sup>46</sup>

A power structure has emerged within the environmental movement. Groups are arrayed according to size of staff as well as the number of projects undertaken; scope and type of activities; and human and financial resources. In terms of access to resources in both Eastern Asia and Southern Africa, the organs of civil society have little connection to regional international organisations. An exception perhaps is the convening of workshops on matters of environmental concern and the building of a wildlife college—to be sure, not a grassroots activity but a registered Southern African Development Community (SADC) project funded by Germany and a consortium of local donors. Such forms of regionalism, some of them under a SADC unit, Environment and Land Management Systems (ELMS), are only beginning to emerge. ELMS is mainly

donor-driven, and has established some NGO focal points in various countries. Formed as a defence against apartheid, SADC remains a loose organisation without much capacity vested in it. For the most part, the formal regional infrastructure to support civil society projects is weak.

Both SADC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are largely remote from the day-to-day activities of civil society. Part of the explanation is that different political coalitions are operative in each country and embrace diverse paradigms, some of which discourage the development of civil society. Another factor is the power relationship between North and South. In civil society in Eastern Asia and Southern Africa, ties to Northern governmental and nongovernmental institutions are stronger than are links within the subregions themselves. In both subregions, regional and subregional international organisations have not developed clear environmental policies, and the United Nations Environmental Programme has not had the capacity to connect to civil society.

In the practice of environmental resistance politics, several problems have arisen. A large NGO bureaucracy has mushroomed and individual NGOs have established a sense of territoriality. There is no formal code of ethics that governs or mitigates competition between NGOs. More conversation among different institutions in civil society is a good thing, but can there be too much diversity? Sometimes schisms emerge—for example, between the conservationists and those who focus on the link between environment and development—over fundamental aims or resources. Bilateral and multilateral donors generally offer an environmental package. Implementation of their projects on the ground produces an island effect: isolated initiatives that are not effectively interrelated typically include a United States Agency for International Development project here, a Canadian or a Swedish project there, and so on. Embeddedness in the local social structure is often lacking. Nationally based NGOs can serve as proxies for international agencies, with little or no organic connection to the roots of society. Similarly, there is a pizza effect: environmental programmes are spread on top of one another without any overall design.<sup>47</sup> In fact, some of the institutions in civil society are not really civil-society driven, but corporate or state-driven, for they are held accountable to their sponsors and have little autonomy.

Closely related, there is the question of co-optation. Under what conditions do or should grassroots movements accept or rebuff funding, and who is setting the agenda? In a proposed reversal of the classical dependency syndrome built into aid packages and structural adjustment programmes, some organs of civil society have proposed systematically monitoring international agencies and other donors. There is also the ethical dilemma, anticipated by Gramsci over a half century ago, of whether to contest elections in government, and become part of the state, rather than serve as a countervailing source of pressure and perhaps as a social conscience that raises ethical issues. Even if leaders of civil society do not take government posts, the dangers of state substitution and parallelism arise. Government agencies and interstate organisations are essentially subcontracting some of their work to NGOs. The institutions of civil society thus perform certain functions normally performed by the state, and sometimes carry them out more efficiently than do the politicians and bureaucrats.

To mitigate these tensions, techniques of negotiation within civil society are of course used to solve problems. Fora such as the Environment Liaison Forum, formally launched in Zimbabwe in 1996, and the Consultative National Environmental Policy Process (CONNEPP) in South Africa, set in motion by the post-apartheid government in collaboration with the myriad institutions of civil society, are bringing diverse stakeholders together in an ongoing process of attempting to find common ground. Nonetheless, there are serious differences over strategies appropriate for contesting globalisation, a wide variety of which has been deployed.

### Core strategies of resistance

The resistance employs both old and new strategies. There is nothing new about counterbalancing state power; plying symbols such as placards, posters and leaflets; relying on the residual power to refuse; or networking in order to galvanise the efforts of different groups up against a variety of forms of environmental degradation, as was done at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. These tested strategies remain important, and as Broad with Cavanagh point out: 'no unified strategy on how to build a sustainable alternative has yet emerged'.<sup>48</sup> There is no single model of resistance.

Yet globalisation is transforming the parameters, redefining the constraints and upping the environmental ante, especially for future generations. Innovative strategies specifically crafted to resist globalisation are not merely stabs in the dark at an amorphous phenomenon. Some—by no means all—groups that are self-organising have engaged in self-conscious strategizing about countering globalisation. These resisters have thought out the question: what kind of political interventions can be adopted to subject neoliberal globalisation, often mediated by national and local programmes, to social control? Five core strategies seem most important, and are being employed individually or in combination.

First is a social compact devised to curb such abuses as the destruction and erosion of watershed areas, frequently through 'legal' or illegal activities carried out by transnational corporations, as in North-Central Mindanao, which includes the Autonomous Region for the Muslim population as well as the Cagayan de Oro-Illigan Growth Corridor. A social compact is a formal understanding among all concerned parties about objectives and methods. It entails a public pledge and commitment among the signatories for the attainment of the common social good. It is based on consensual solutions and co-operation among people of different faiths.<sup>49</sup> In other words, in the teeth of top-down globalisation, the concept of a social compact is designed to promote democratic control from the bottom in localities. It requires technical capacity in the form of a monitoring body to ensure that all parties abide by the agreement.

Inasmuch as globalisation embraces, and is facilitated by, technological advances, resistance involves developing new knowledge structures. Simply put, a precondition for resisting globalisation is to understand it. Hence the importance of the chain of education-research-information. In the view of Zukiswa



Shibane, a Zimbabwean activist, 'Desperate people won't fight globalisation unless they are educated'.<sup>50</sup> What some educators are striving to reclaim and transmit is indigenous and traditional knowledge about the environment, which is seen as but one part of building research capacity through networks in an effort to comprehend the dynamics of globalisation. The objective of environmental education is to generate information for action, share it with the public, and channel it to the media so as to challenge globalising forces that jeopardise the public interest. Not only is this an aspiration but, in a practical case, providing access to information regarding municipal zoning and the risks encountered with toxic materials clearly affected the mobilisation of a number of communities around Chloorkop, South Africa. In a rich case study of Chloorkop, a researcher observes: 'important is the fact that the development of an environmental consciousness, a precursor to environmental mobilisation, stemmed from both organisational activity and access to information'.<sup>51</sup> In short, an appreciation of the strategic importance of knowledge generation is not new, but what is novel are the linkages suggested in knowledge production and diffusion as well as perhaps the method to point towards an alternative paradigm. If only in a preliminary way, it may be possible to piece together a method of developing knowledge for resistance politics: deciphering the codes of domination, exposing the fault lines of power structures, identifying the pressure points for action, and fashioning images for counter-identification.<sup>52</sup>

The third core strategy is scaling up: an increase in the scope of operations. More specifically, it is a process whereby groups within civil society broaden their impact by building links with other sectors and extending their reach beyond the local area. Asked what scaling up means in practice, two leaders in civil society, interviewed jointly, said 'expanding the level of operations in the field' and 'having a strong voice at the policy level to influence government'.<sup>53</sup> Another activist explained scaling-up resistance in terms of the different time horizons of globalisation. Unlike the resistance that seeks to strike immediately at concrete manifestations of globalisation, scaling up takes a longer span of time. It involves synergising different skills and capacities as well as building spaces to contest globalisation.<sup>54</sup>

Translated into practice, scaling up can entail establishing multisectoral fora beyond the *barangay*, the basic unit in the Philippines, or co-ordinating among several sectors so as to paralyse a city or stop plans for, say, opening casinos. Operationally, however, it seems that when resisters try to scale up, the parametric transformation wrought by globalisation, especially the ideology of neoliberalism, obfuscates its dynamics. Insofar as globalisation's architecture is perceived as too big for local life, it causes disorientation. In some cases, the ambiguity rendered by globalising structures precipitates a paradoxical reaction, which is not to scale up but to scale down. This backlash is an attempt to erect a fortress around the community, to localise rather than to engage the forces of globalisation. Indeed, there is good reason to try to assert local control, particularly in places and spheres of activity where globalisation involves the most acute forms of loss of control. To be sure, the more local groups extend to the global arena, the greater the temptation to conform to global norms.

Nonetheless, the quickening speed of environmental degradation, its irreversibility in some cases and its transnational reach suggest that, by itself, scaling down is not a sufficient means to protect nature's endowment.

Fourth, resisters seek to thrust out in order to gain wider latitude for direct voluntary action. Earlier, reference was made to top-down forms of market-driven and state-led regionalism. In response, regionalism at the base may be either bilateral or multilateral among organisations and movements, and may thrust globally to forge links with civil societies in other regions as well. Although sometimes circumspect about 'going regional' or 'going global' because of fear of being eclipsed or losing control, especially to large Northern partners, Southern NGOs are increasingly aware of the potential advantages of transnational collaboration.<sup>55</sup> Earthlife Africa, for example, now has branches not only in South Africa, but also in Namibia and Uganda. Trade unions in the region share information and mount joint educational workshops to provide training. Transboundary parks are a new undertaking, an effort to forge partnerships among government, private donors, and different sectors of civil society. In Eastern Asia, the strategy of thrusting out draws significantly on the experience of the Philippines, given the density and relative maturity of civil society there. Its NGO sector has been invited to share experiences with its counterparts in other countries. In dialogue with the representatives of civil society elsewhere, Philippine NGOs have also been involved in monitoring international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, with the goal of fashioning sustainable and alternative policies.

Noteworthy among attempts to define alternatives to neoliberal regionalism is the People's Plan of the Twenty-first Century (PP21), a process that began in Japan in 1989. A coalition of grassroots movements and action groups brought together 360 activists from various countries to meet thousands of Japanese members of civil society. They sought to establish goals and strategies based on modelling alternative social relations, not direct struggle with state structures. Following a meeting with representatives from six Central American countries, a second PP21 forum was held in Thailand in 1992, and basic concepts were hammered out. Efforts are underway to breath life into the idea of 'transborder participatory democracy', and consideration is being given to the implications of living according to the strictures of a 'single, global division of labour', a hierarchy that spawns 'inter-people conflicts and antagonism'. As well as conferences, workshops and electronic communication, the PP21 process includes a secretariat based in Tokyo and a quarterly review, *AMPO*.<sup>56</sup>

Engaging regional processes is a space that popular movements in Eastern Asia have sought to establish. For example, environmental organisations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have set up the Climate Action Network, with its own secretariat. In 1995–96 environmental NGOs requested observer status in ASEAN, and were rebuffed on the grounds that there is no such mechanism. When this bid was scotched, the NGOs argued that, inasmuch as other international institutions, including the UN, provide access for people's organisations, ASEAN should do so too. Then in 1997 the members of the Climate Action Network wrote to the ministers of the environment in their

respective countries asking for the opportunity to address them, and were told that the officials did not have time for a hearing.<sup>57</sup>

Popular movements in Eastern Asia have also targeted the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) process of summitry and its agenda of deepening and broadening liberalisation policies, which can be far reaching: APEC's 18 members account for about 56% of the world's Gross Domestic Product and 46% of its exports. Working across borders, people's movements took aim at the 1996 APEC summit in Manila. First, they held a preparatory meeting in Kyoto, and mounted parallel NGO fora in various countries, yielding specific resolutions and action points designed to oppose member-governments' trade and investment regimes that damage the environment and transgress people's rights. Preparations entailed pre-summit, fact-finding missions to various locales so that delegates themselves could study precisely how forms of integration affect communities and their modes of livelihood. The documentation included a critique of 'the breakneck pace and unilateral character' of blanket liberalisation, especially in terms of its impact on the most vulnerable sectors and the environment, and took issue with the way that the APEC provisions 'dissociate economic issues from their social implications and effects'<sup>58</sup> Women have contested 'APEC opportunities that will fast track our rapidly shifting economic environment'.<sup>59</sup> In light of a labour market structured along gender lines and the consequences for women and children, delegates called for, among other things, government financing for 'a social welfare agenda to soften globalisation's adverse effects'.<sup>60</sup> Although probably unintentional, the pre-summit Forum's message seemed to bear shrill—hardly modulated—overtones of a Polanyian analysis; it assailed APEC for its 'anti-democratic, unaccountable and untransparent' free trade processes, and explained the need to protect the people from 'the ravages of market forces'.<sup>61</sup>

Without exaggerating the importance of the above instance, there are important lessons to be derived. A market-driven, state-led process—APEC—has catalysed intercourse among resistance movements in different countries, and grassroots organisations have set a regional agenda, one very different from that of state power holders. For example, in contrast to the latter's thrust, grassroots groups emphasise the need to link trade and investment, on the one hand, and social policy, on the other. Additionally, this process of resistance not only ties the substate level to the state level, but also elucidates key relationships between regionalism and globalisation.

In Southern Africa, the impetus for thrusting out at the regional level and beyond comes from different pressure points, but the programme of one environmental movement stands out for its level of resistance activities, especially those that highlight the contradictions between professed policies and the lack of implementation. Its green stance implicitly contests economic policy as well. The Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) includes more than 550 organisations that embrace common values, and largely represents the underprivileged sector of society. It seeks to identify spurs to regionalisation, and engages in bridge-building with other movements.<sup>62</sup>

Landmark resistance activities have centred on chemicals. The case of Thor Chemicals, a British-based multinational corporation that imports waste from a

US company called Cyanamid, came to the fore in 1990, when large concentrations of highly toxic mercury were found in the Umgeweni River not far from its Cato Ridge plant near Durban. Earthlife Africa (a member of EJNF), the Chemical Workers Industrial Union, local residents under their chief, and white commercial farmers pursued the question: why did Thor build the world's largest toxic mercury recycling plant in a remote location in South Africa? An alliance of trade unions, rural peasants and green groups from different countries mounted demonstrations at Thor and at Cyanamid's plant in the USA. This joint action within civil society put pressure on the Department of Water Affairs, which ordered Thor Chemicals to suspend its operations.<sup>63</sup>

The toxic waste issue, however, did not go away. Rather, South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry was reluctant to endorse a ban on movements of toxic waste between African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. It became apparent that there is a regional trade, a thriving industry, in toxic waste. The EJNF expressed outrage at the revelations that post-apartheid South Africa imported waste for recycling from several African countries, and that Pretoria feared losing the income if it were to sign Article 39 of the Lomé Convention, which stipulates: 'the ACP States shall prohibit the direct or indirect import into their territory of such waste from the Community or from any other country'.<sup>64</sup> The government agreed to sign the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, adopted by 65 countries in 1989 and implemented in 1992. This international accord bans all movement of hazardous waste from industrial to developing countries from January 1998, but does not apply to traffic in toxins within Southern Africa. Hence, EJNF exposed a possible backdoor route for bringing in lucrative materials through neighbouring countries.<sup>65</sup> It became evident that state officials were trading off the regime's progressive agenda against neoliberal economic pressures. Resistance to the government's original policy contributed to the decision to reverse its position and include Article 39 of the Lomé Convention in its final trade and development agreement with the European Union. Gathering information and access to the media were important aspects of the resistance strategy. A strategy of thrusting out involved developing links with the transnational green movement so that vital information could flow back to South Africa. Again, illuminating the specific links between the regional issue and globalisation was crucial.

A fifth strategy of resistance builds innovative relationships between social movements in order directly to engage the market and establish an alternative, sustainable ecological system. In 1986, farmers from Negros Island in the Philippines and Japanese consumer co-operatives, large organisations whose members sought a substitute for the chemically laden products sold on the market, began to trade with one another. Negros grassroots communities sought a basis to transform the island's sugar-monoculture plantation economy into an integrated system of agriculture, industry and finance. They have fundamentally attempted to remake the economy through the mutual exchange of products and services in a cyclic manner. This project includes a transborder North-South trading system, whereby an autonomous association of small farmers delivers chemical-free bananas to Japanese consumer associations of nearly one million people. The Negros growers have developed organic agriculture and set the price

of bananas three times higher than the market price of bananas produced by transnational corporations on Mindanao Island. The elevated price, which consumers gladly pay for chemical-free products, amounts to a reverse transfer of value from the North to the South.<sup>66</sup>

At a Tokyo meeting of representatives of the two organisations, I was struck by their class membership—small farmers from Negros and Japanese workers, many of them in the service sector and mostly in the lower reaches of the middle class. Together, these groups have sought to resist not the market economy but market society. They have established an alternative circuit of capital under social control—what Polanyi regarded as re-embedding the market in society and nature. This project includes cross-visits between the two communities so that social and political ties are generalised beyond trading relations. The strategy is a transboundary initiative that breaks out of the cage of the nation-state, as do other initiatives by risk takers who strive to build social capital.

Community forestry is another example of movement-to-movement relationships that are meant to offer a sustainable alternative to the conventional market system. To substitute non-timber products such as ratan, vines and river resources for wood, links are being forged between corporations, NGOs, and associations of direct producers.<sup>67</sup> Without going into more detail, it is apparent that collective resistance is intensifying, giving rise to multilayering strategies employed according to the varied ways that globalising trends affect individual countries and regions.

### **Fledgling tendencies**

The research findings show that in ways that I had not anticipated before undertaking this fieldwork, the three analytical frameworks—Gramsci, Polanyi and Scott—overlap, deepen understanding of environmental resistance politics and may be integrated. Yes, Polanyi provides an overall theoretical thrust for exploring resistance to globalisation in the environmental realm. Approaching resistance in a Polanyian manner as an attempt to re-embed the economy in society *and* nature is extremely valuable, and the probings of Gramsci and Scott enhance this inquiry. For example, fieldwork on strategies of resistance led to the notion of ‘deciphering codes of domination’, and here Scott’s concept of infrapolitics provides the most explanatory power. Gramsci’s insights on environmental ideology as a means to secure consensus so as to lessen reliance on more costly forms of coercion are also a strong tool for understanding resistance politics. The concrete evidence drawn from Eastern Asia and Southern Africa demonstrates how the three frameworks are integral to understanding environmental resistance, and in turn helps to sharpen the theoretical perspective.

By all indications, the data indicate an expansion of space for resistance to neoliberal globalisation, but thus far resistant non-state politics has had a limited impact. Within civil society, one of the reasons for forming coalitions and networks is to foster more democratic politics. However, upscaling and linking these associations does not of course solve the problem of hierarchical power relations integral to top-down globalisation. As a political vehicle countering

globalisation, environmental resistance movements run on many engines. They can both follow and lead the state.

On the basis of the foregoing research findings, it is possible to identify five trends, all micro-counter-globalising tendencies: (1) In light of the diversity of experiences and contexts, many environmental initiatives are issue-orientated and subject-specific. At present, most environmental struggles are localised. (2) Nonetheless, there is a putting together of modest resistance activities based on the forging of overlapping alliances and networks within and between regions. (3) Environmental movements have implicitly adopted a policy of parallelism—ie replicating in one context resistance strategies that have proven successful elsewhere. (4) The core strategies are positive, not a negation, in the sense of engagement; they do not evade—delink from—either the market or the state. (5) The resistance is accumulating critical venues such as cultural integrity and ancestral domain, and finding more openings.

Quite clearly, it would be wrong to celebrate these Polanyian counterforces. One might even call them what Polanyi regarded as a 'move' rather than movements to indicate the proto forms by which social forces 'waxed and waned' before ultimately giving birth to a political organisation that begot a transformation of a particular type.<sup>68</sup> Although some of them are federating, today's environmental counterforces are anything but coherent. Perhaps a high level of coherence is a desideratum that should be balanced against another consideration, namely that civil society feeds on diversity. Also, given the impediments to organising, regional and interregional solidarity from below is some way off. Regional and global civil society are, at best, nascent and highly uneven.

Within both Eastern Asia and Southern Africa, grassroots movements encounter regional hegemony, with Japan and South Africa being, by far, the major centres of power. Compared with the West, few countries in these subregions have strong civil societies. Relatively robust civil societies are evolving in the Philippines and Thailand, and are emerging elsewhere. Such thickening is to be found only in South Africa in the African subcontinent, though Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe are developing a web of NGOs that influences public policy. In the other countries, channels for the inclusion of the civil-society sector remain weak. It is up to the organs of civil society to articulate their own demands. In both subregions, a lively dialectic of inclusion and exclusion is at work in the relations between state and civil society. Eastern Asia, of course, has much stronger states, with greater capacity, than do the countries of Southern Africa. Generally speaking, civil society in Eastern Asia is also more vibrant than in Southern Africa, though in many cases weak in relation to the state.

In each of these two internally diverse subregions, the level of resistance, the degree of organisation and the efficacy of the movements can be explained in terms of facilitating and inhibiting factors. Without overworking the comparison, what leaps out from this two-by-two matrix—the two sets of factors in the two subregions—are the constraints in Southern Africa relative to those in Eastern Asia. In a fundamental sense, material conditions have retarded self-organising in Southern Africa. What the playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa, executed in an environmental struggle in eastern Nigeria, said there applies equally in Southern

Africa: 'In the end the real difficulty was having to cope with the debilitating poverty of the people. It stymied organisation, and stopped people from doing what they would like to do'.<sup>69</sup> The lack of technological development, especially in advanced communications, also hampers and thus localises civil society in Southern Africa. Compared with access in Eastern Asia, the availability of computers, use of the Internet and the growth of information technology in Southern Africa are negligible. Also, racial ideology has deflected attention from environmental issues and has slowed organising around other social problems. Although Eastern Asia has also experienced ethnic and racial tensions, sometimes violent, as in Malaysia and Indonesia, they have not reached the level or transnational scope endemic to the history of Southern Africa, especially when white minority regimes held power. For many years, racism was given stark expression in the form of protracted military and economic destabilisation, waged in the subcontinent by the apartheid regime and its *aides-de-camp*.

Now, the liberation movements hold, or share, state power in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the main environmental groups had supported them in the drive to dismantle white rule. In South Africa civil society has undoubtedly waned since 1994, when apartheid ended,<sup>70</sup> and, within limits the African National Congress (ANC)-led government supports environmental causes. The ANC is the premier case of a resistance movement that commands state power. This presents a complex set of dilemmas for the organs of civil society; many of their members belong to, and even shed blood for, the ANC. Elsewhere in the subregion, single party-dominant systems—eg the Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front—have sought to legitimise themselves by claiming the banner of liberation and donning the mantle of resistance. They are known to use the tactics of intimidation on environmental movements. But as Gramsci pointed out, coercion need not be applied in appreciable measure if consent is produced. As we have seen, paradigms as well as environmental ideologies provide the syntax and a substructure of power.

Thus in Southern Africa, there is still the legacy and mindset that national parks are a white playground, a negative world alien to blacks. To a man, the early conservationists in South Africa had military backgrounds and were commercial hunters or sportsmen seeking trophies. This ideology was of course challenged and is eroded but, as indicated, continues to dovetail with class consciousness among black workers who regard the environment as a liberal cause for the privileged sectors of society.

At the end of the day, the impetus for resistance politics is not only material or technological, but decidedly intertwined with the environmental ethic of protecting people and their diverse ways of life against quickening market forces. The words of a Jesuit priest engaged in environmental struggles in the Philippines give pause: 'Spirituality is associated with suffering. This landscape bleeds. This is a suffering landscape'.<sup>71</sup> The force of this message drives a powerful spiritual question in the path of globalisation: must the environment be experienced negatively, as a constraint, in terms of destruction, rather than as beauty to be relished and preserved? Posing the dilemma in this way raises the political issue of who should be entrusted, or empowered, to look after the public good.

## Notes

I am indebted to colleagues who facilitated this study, especially Glenn Adler, Jorge Emmanuel, Akihiko Kimijima, Francisco Magno, Leonor Magtolis-Briones, Chito Salazar and Yash Tandon. I am grateful for critical comments on drafts of this article provided by Glenn Adler, Paul Wapner, and Linda J. Yarr. All errors of course remain mine alone.

- <sup>1</sup> A preliminary and abbreviated version of this article, without the cross-regional analysis or much of the theoretical discussion, appears as my 'Resisting globalisation: environmental politics in Eastern Asia', in Kris Olds *et al* (eds), *Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories*, London: Routledge, 1999. The editorial team for that book—Kris Olds, Peter Dickin, Philip Kelly, Lily Kong and Henry Yeung—contributed importantly to this work.
- <sup>2</sup> Vandana Shiva, 'Resources', in Wolfgang Sachs (ed), *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, London: Zed Books, 1992, pp 211, 216.
- <sup>3</sup> James N Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp 190–191.
- <sup>4</sup> Robert W Hefner, (ed), *Market Cultures: Society and Values in the New Asian Capitalisms*, Boulder, CO: Steven Yearley, *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization: Reinventing the Globe*, London: Sage, 1996; Westview Press, 1998; Heng Pek Koon, 'Robert Kuok and the Chinese Business Network in Eastern Asia: a study in sino-capitalism', in Timothy Brook & Hy V Luong (eds), *Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997 pp 155–86; Gary Hamilton, (ed), *Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia*, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs No 99, 1991; and S Gordon Redding, *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism*, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.
- <sup>5</sup> James H Mittelman, (ed) *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996; and Mittelman *At the Mercy of Globalization*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- <sup>6</sup> When I began this journey, I regarded it as an academic project, but found that it took on practical and personal significance. An irony in recording my findings is that I did so in Hanoi, where I temporarily became an environmental refugee escaping the effects of choking haze that blanketed six countries and reached 'hazardous' levels on the official air pollution index in 1997. Ostensibly caused by uncontrolled forest fires in Indonesia, drought brought about by El Niño patterns in the oceans, and winds that swept the smoke into neighbouring countries, including Malaysia where I was living, the problem also had other causes: the slash-and-burn techniques practised by transnational agribusiness, the lack of a political will to deal with some of the domestic sources of pollution in countries engaged in high-speed economic growth, and the fact that special interests outside and inside the state thwart strong remedial action. The immediate impact of the environmental crisis was deaths linked to respiratory illnesses, a welter of ancillary health problems overcrowding the hospitals, accidents attributable to poor visibility, and enormous direct economic costs, especially in tourism, agriculture, education and industries that had to cut back or pay fines. Plainly, the magnitude of this crisis reached major regional and global proportions. A salutary effect of the haze was that it alerted the public to the systemic consequences of unbridled economic growth and of looking exclusively or primarily to government for solutions. Embryonic yet mounting are the signs of disgruntlement and political resistance in the face of the roles that the market and the state have played in trespassing against nature, which has given manifest signals that its limits have been violated.
- <sup>7</sup> In keeping with conventional practice, I use the term 'NGO', but with reservations. NGO is an unfortunate construct since, by definition, it is a negation, and the frame of reference is solely the state. In fact, with globalisation and neoliberal pressures to reduce the scope of the state, the work of many NGOs now substitutes for activities previously performed by the state. Additionally, some NGOs are financially supported by the state and interstate organisations. In short, globalisation blurs the lines between government and 'nongovernmental organisations'.
- <sup>8</sup> Farieda Khan, 'Rewriting South Africa's conservation history—the role of the Native Farmers Association', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20(4), 1994 pp 499–516.
- <sup>9</sup> June Carruthers, *The Kruger National Park: A Social and Political History*, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995; and Farieda Khan, 'Beyond the white rhino: confronting the South African land question', *African Wildlife*, 44(6), 1990, pp 321–324.
- <sup>10</sup> Khan, 'Rewriting South Africa's conservation history'.
- <sup>11</sup> Christine B N Chin & James H Mittelman, 'Conceptualising resistance to globalisation', *New Political Economy*, 2(1), 1997, pp 25–37.
- <sup>12</sup> Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans and ed by Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
- <sup>13</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.
- <sup>14</sup> James C Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.



- <sup>15</sup> Aihwa Ong, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987.
- <sup>16</sup> In this vein, Adas concludes his research findings on peasant resistance with a helpful formulation: 'Avoidance protest in its many forms can protect, win specific concessions or exact revenge, but it cannot reform in major ways or transform unjust socio-political systems. Only modes of confrontational protest can achieve the latter'. Michael Adas, 'From footdragging to flight: the evasive history of peasant avoidance protest in South and South-east Asia', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 13(7), 1986, pp 83–86.
- <sup>17</sup> Peter Harries-Jones, Abraham Rotstein & Peter Timmerman. 'Nature's veto: UNCED and the debate over the earth', unpublished paper, 1992. This phrasing embodies a departure from the dualism contained in the distinction between humankind and nature.
- <sup>18</sup> For example, Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1998. R B J Walker, 'Social movements/world politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23(3), 1994, pp 669–700; Leslie Sklair, 'Global sociology and global environmental change', in M. Redclift & T. Benton (eds), *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, London: Routledge, 1994, pp 205–227; Leslie Sklair, 'Social movements and global capitalism: the transnational capitalist class in action', *Review of International Political Economy* 4(3), 1997, pp 514–538; and Martin Shaw, 'Civil society and global politics: beyond a social movements approach', *Millennium*, 23(3), 1994 pp, 647–667.
- <sup>19</sup> Polanyi, *The Great Transformations*, p 167, emphasis added.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, p 157.
- <sup>21</sup> Mitchell Bernard, 'Ecology, political economy and the counter-movement: Karl Polanyi and the second great transformation', in Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (eds), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 pp 75–89.
- <sup>22</sup> *The Great Transformation* was originally published in 1944.
- <sup>23</sup> Fred Block & Margaret R. Somers, 'Beyond the economic fallacy: the holistic social science of Karl Polanyi', in Theda Skocpol (ed), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp 47–84.
- <sup>24</sup> Karl Polanyi, *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi*, ed. G Dalton, New York: Anchor, 1968.
- <sup>25</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, ed Harry W Pearson, New York: Academic Press, 1997, pp 19, emphasis in the original.
- <sup>26</sup> Interview with the Woman's Committee of the Freedom from Debt Coalition, Manila, 13 March 1996.
- <sup>27</sup> Virginia D Nazarea-Sandoval, *Local Knowledge and Agricultural Decision Making in the Philippines: Class, Gender, and Resistance*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.
- <sup>28</sup> Interviews with Romulo A del Castillo, Professor of Forest Resources and Director, University of the Philippines, Los Baños Agroforestry Program, Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines, 11 March 1996; and Lucrecio L Rebugio, Professor and Dean, College of Forestry, University of the Philippines, Los Baños, Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines, 11 March 1996.
- <sup>29</sup> Nancy Lee Peluso, *Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp 13; and James C Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
- <sup>30</sup> Peluso, *Rich Forests, Poor People*, pp 13, 16–17, and Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*.
- <sup>31</sup> Ronnie Lipschutz, 'Restructuring world politics: the emergence of global civil society', *Millennium*, 21(3), 1992, pp 389–420.
- <sup>32</sup> Paul Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- <sup>33</sup> Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p 208.
- <sup>34</sup> Isagani R Serrano, 'Civil society in the Asia-Pacific Region', in CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (ed), *Citizens: Strengthening Global Civil Society*, Washington, DC: CIVICUS, 1994, p 309.
- <sup>35</sup> Interview with Ho Hua Chow, Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 5 December 1997.
- <sup>36</sup> Ho Hua Chow, 'A value orientation for nature preservation in Singapore', *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment*, 1997, 44, pp 91–107; Garry Rodan, 'Theorising political opposition in East and Southeast Asia', in Rodan (ed), *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, London: Routledge, 1996 pp 106–107; and Lily Kong, "'Environment" as a social concern: democratizing public arenas in Singapore?', *Sojourn*, 9(2), 1994, pp 277–287.
- <sup>37</sup> Interview with Gurmit Singh K S, Executive Director, Centre for Environment, Technology and Development, Malaysia, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 15 November 1997.
- <sup>38</sup> See Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*.
- <sup>39</sup> J Peter Brosius, 'Endangered forest, endangered people: environmentalist representations of indigenous knowledge', *Human Ecology* 25(1), 1997, pp 47–69; Bernard Eccleston, 'Does North–South collaboration enhance NGO influence on deforestation policies in Malaysia and Indonesia?', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 34(1), 1996, pp 66–89 and Bernard Eccleston, & David Potter, 'Environmental NGOs

- and different political contexts in South-East Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam', in M. Parnwell & R. Bryant (eds), *Environmental Change in South-East Asia*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp 49–66.
- <sup>40</sup> Interview with Danilo A Songco, National Co-ordinator, CODE-NGO, Quezon City, Philippines, 13 March 1996.
- <sup>41</sup> Quoted in Francisco A Magno, 'The growth of Philippine environmentalism', *Kasarinlan* 9(1), 1993, p 15.
- <sup>42</sup> Interviews with Apollo de Guzman, parish priest and President, Confederation of Nueva Ecijanons for the Environment and Social Order, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Luzon, Philippines, 9 March 1996; and Victor Dacumos, Chairman, Guardians of the Environment for the Future of Youth, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, 9 March 1996.
- <sup>43</sup> Interview with Joseph Z Z Matowanyika, Director, ZERO, Harare, Zimbabwe, 11 July 1996.
- <sup>44</sup> Interview with the Toxics Group of Earthlife Africa, meeting, Brixton, Johannesburg, South Africa, 15 July 1996.
- <sup>45</sup> Interview with Pelelo Magane, organizer, Chemical Workers Industrial Union, Johannesburg, South Africa, 30 July 1996.
- <sup>46</sup> Interview with Nomtha Dilima, Director, Tsoga Environmental Centre, Langa, Cape Town, South Africa, 23 July 1996.
- <sup>47</sup> Interview with Braggy Braganza, research scientist, Environmental Research Division of the Institute of Environmental Science for Social Change (formerly the Manila Observatory), Quezon City, Philippines, 2 March 1996.
- <sup>48</sup> Robin Broad, with John Cavanagh, *Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the Environment in the Philippines*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p 146.
- <sup>49</sup> Interview with Francisco T Albaran, Agriculturist, MUCARD, Cagayan de Oro City, Mindanao, Philippines, 4 March 1986.
- <sup>50</sup> Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), 'Proceedings of the Conference on Regional Co-operation in Environmental Governance', Broederstroom, South Africa, November 1996.
- <sup>51</sup> Michelle Buchler, 'Community-based environmentalism in transitional South Africa: social movements and the development of local democracy', unpublished MA thesis, Department of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1995, p 72.
- <sup>52</sup> Yahya Zawiah *Resisting Colonialist Discourse*, Bangi, Malaysia: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 1994, pp 16–18.
- <sup>53</sup> Interview with Horacio 'Boy' Morales, President, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Quezon City, Philippines, 13 March 1996; and Isagani R Serrano, Vice President, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Quezon City, Philippines, 13 March 1996.
- <sup>54</sup> Interview with Edicio dela Torre, President, Folk Philippine–Danish School, Quezon City, Philippines, 12 March 1996. For a concrete illustration and analysis, see Philip F Kelly, 'Globalisation, power and the politics of scale in the Philippines', *Geoforum* 28(2), 1997, pp 151–171.
- <sup>55</sup> Eccleston, 'Does North–South collaboration enhance NGO influence?', p 82.
- <sup>56</sup> Ichiyo Muto, 'PP21: a step in a process', *AMPO Japan–Asia Quarterly Review*, 25(2), 1994, pp 47–53. Interviews with Muto, Pacific Asia Resource Center, Tokyo, 25 February 1996; and Reiko Inoue, Director, Pacific Asia Resource Center, Tokyo, 24 February 1996.
- <sup>57</sup> Interview with Gurmit Singh K S.
- <sup>58</sup> 'Proposed Philippine PO-NGO position', Executive Summary, Manila People's Forum (MPF) on APEC, unpublished document, Manila, 1996.
- <sup>59</sup> National Council of Women of the Philippines (NCWP), 'APEC and the women: catching the next wave', GO-NGO Forum on Women, unpublished document, 16 July 1996.
- <sup>60</sup> Women's Forum, 'Women's forum for the APEC Manila process', Manila People's Forum on APEC, unpublished document, Manila, 3 July 1996.
- <sup>61</sup> Manila People's Forum on APEC, 1996 'Hidden costs of free trade: statement of the Philippine PO-NGO Summit on the APEC', unpublished document, Quezon City, Philippines, 6 July 1996.
- <sup>62</sup> Interview with Chris Albertyn and Co-workers, National Co-ordinator, Environmental Justice Networking Forum, Braamfontein, South Africa, 2 August 1996.
- <sup>63</sup> Rod Crompton & Alec Erwin, 'Reds and greens: Labour and the environment', in Jacklyn Cock (ed), *Going Green*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp 78–91.
- <sup>64</sup> Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, *Internationales Umweltrecht—Multilaterale Verträge*, BZUB7/1.92, 989:93/11, 1990, p 1.
- <sup>65</sup> Eddie Koch, 'SA still under fire for toxic waste policy', *Mail & Guardian* (Braamfontein) 5–11 July 1996, interview with Koch, Environmental Editor, *Mail & Guardian*, Braamfontein, 19 July; and Koch, 'SA still in the waste business', *Mail & Guardian*, 26 July–1 August 1996.
- <sup>66</sup> Interview with Masahiko Hotta, President, Alter Trade Japan, Tokyo, 25 February 1996; and Ichiyo Muto & Smitu Kothari, 'Towards sustainable systems', Tokyo, unpublished discussion paper for PP21, Tokyo, nd.
- <sup>67</sup> Interview with Gary James C Tengco, Project Co-ordinator, Institute of Environmental Science for Social Change (formerly Environmental Research Division of the Manila Observatory). Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Luzon, Philippines, 9 March 1996.

<sup>68</sup> Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, p 239.

<sup>69</sup> Ken Saro-Wiwa, *A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary*, New York: Penguin, 1995, p 214.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with Kader Asmal, Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, 31 July 1996.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with Peter W S J Walpole, Executive Director, Institute of Environmental Science for Social Change (formerly Environmental Research Division of the Manila Observatory), Quezon City, Philippines, 12 March 1996.

from MIT Press Journals

**International Organization**  
Peter Gourevitch and  
David A. Lake, Editors

*International Organization* is one of the leading scholarly journals of international affairs in the world. Its actual scope is much broader than its title may suggest. The journal presents seminal articles not only on international institutions and cooperation but also on economic policy issues, security policies, and other aspects of international relations and foreign policy. Topics covered recently by *IO* include: • trade policies and the GATT • environmental disputes and agreements • European integrations • alliance patterns and war • bargaining and conflict resolution • economic development and adjustment • international capital movements

Select recent articles include: *Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization* by Sun-Ki Chai; *The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement* by Barbara F. Walter; *Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of the USTR* by Marcus Noland; *Dueling Realisms* by Stephen Brooks; *Financial Interdependence and the State* by Thomas D. Willett; *Financial Interdependence and the State* by David Andrews; *Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round* by Robert Paarlberg, and more.

All print subscriptions to *IO* include access to an electronic version, now available from the OCLC (Online Computer Library Center) Electronic Collections Online. For more information point to *IO*'s web site:

<http://mitpress.mit.edu/IO>

**1998 Rates:** Individual \$42; Institution \$120; Student\*/Retired \$26. \*Copy of student ID required. Outside U.S. and Canada add \$16 postage and handling. Canadians add 7% GST. Prepayment is required. Prices are subject to change without notice. Send check, payable to *International Organization*, drawn against a U.S. bank in U.S. funds—MC, VISA, or AMEX number to: MIT Press Journals Five Cambridge Center / Cambridge, MA 02142 Tel: 617 253-2889 / Fax: 617 577-1545 / [journals-orders@mit.edu](mailto:journals-orders@mit.edu)

Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the *IO* Foundation. ISSN 0020-8183