Anatomy of Factional Conflict

P. N. Rastogi

Conflict is one of the basic forms of human interaction. Factionalism refers to a particular type of conflict i.e. between a class of groups designated as 'factions'. In the present paper an attempt has been made to explore the distinctive nature of factionalism as a species of social conflict. In this context, I have tried to isolate certain common dimensions of the diverse types of faction situations in space and time. The latter have been deemed *to* be isomorphic *qua* their being factional.

What Are Factions?

Factions are human groups. But as groups they differ from other social units of the same type in important respects. Essentially, they do not pertain to the groups of the first order in the same sense as for example family, kin, clan or other hereditary groups. The character of these basic groups in a society defines its structural architecture whereas factions represent a less basic but more dynamic and unstable type of unit. As Firth points out, they are more loosely organised than descent groups on the one hand and formal organisations like club and associations on the other (1957: 292). As structural units, they possess coherence but may lack cohesion. And apparently, they signify a distortion of the group parameters.

Factions can be 'created' and factionalism is a reproducible phenomenon. They are almost never taken cognizance of as being parts of the 'official' social structure and may widely be recognized as pathological or dysfunctional to a varying degree. Their positive aspects have however, also been noted (Firth 1957: 293-94). Unlike other groups, they signify a state of polarization in terms of two or more sub-groups, with reference to a system. And as such they are temporary and unstable to a differing extent depending upon the course of polarizing tendencies. Membership of factions is apt to change as the complexion of the situation alters or as the interests of the, individuals therein change.

17

' Factions presuppose an antecedent bond of unity. Accordingly, two rival political parties are not factions but two or more rival subgroups trying to capture power or party machinery are. A fight between two villages is not a faction fight but between two groups within a village (although allies may also be drawn from neighbouring villages) is. War between Incas and Spanish invaders was not a factional conflict but that between Pizzaro and Almagro was. Wars between nations are not to be characterized as factional whereas civil wars, various 'fatricidal' wars and many so-called 'revolutions' (as for example in South American countries) and counter revolutions cannot often meaningfully be understood apart from their factional context. The continual reference to the system level is basic to their explication. Factions have their being *within* a system and factionalism is an *intra-system* phenomenon. Existence of factions signifies that the over-arching cohsiveness of the wider group has been seriously weakened. The schism may ultimately even lead to a complete rupture of ties. Factions are apt to fission off eventually as groups with separate identities in the cases of mounting alienation.

Definitions given by Lasswell, Firth, Beals and Siegel parallel the above considerations. According to Lasswell, the term faction designated any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies (1931: 49). For Firth factions are groups or sections of a society in relation of opposition to one another, interested in promoting their own objects rather than those of the society as a whole and often turbulent in their operations (ibid: 292). Beals and Siegel understand factionalism to be an overt conflict within a group leading to an increasing abandonment of co-operative activities (1960: 399). It is 'an overt, unregulated (unresolved) conflict which interferes with the achievement of the goals of the group' (1960: 108). Two main characteristics emerging from these definitions are: (i) that factions are part of a larger anterior group and (ii) that they are in relation of opposition to each other. The substratum of these relations may conceivably vary from case to case.

The formulation offered by Lewis in the context of his work in India, however, differs materially from the position outlined here (1954: 30-31). For him factions are semi-permanent groups based on caste and kin ties and they do not denote only opposite or hostile relations. Inter faction relations may according to him embrace co-operative, economic, social and ceremonial relations as well. Singh fully supports this position and understands factions to be the groups

18

of the first order (1959: 57-58). The untenability of such a view-point would be discussed presently.

Principles of Definition

Within the corpus of an empirical science, two kinds of definitions, nominal and real, may be distinguished. *'A nominal definition'* says Hempel 'may be characterized as a stipulation to the effect that a specified expression, the *defniendum* is to be synonymous with a certain other expression, the *definiens,* whose meaning is already determined' (1952: 2). A real definition on the other hand is conceived of as a statement of the "essential characteristics" of some entity. The treatment of the term faction by Lewis seems to fall in the former category. Equating it as he does with 'small cohesive kinship groupings' based on caste, it is apparent that he is in essence designating the latter by a new term in the manner of a stipulation. It becomes clearer when Singh tells us that 'a faction is primarily a kinship unit consisting of one or more extended families or *Kunbas* (descendants of a single common ancestor) (ibid: 57). Here what we are being given 'is a convention which merely introduces an alternative and not a set of distinctive relational characteristics.'

On the other hand definitions given by Lasswell, Firth, Siegel and Beals appear to fall in the second category. They variously try to define the term by giving what according to them are the essential characteristics of factions. The element of conflict or approbrious relations is central to their formulations while it is peripheral in Lewis as for example when he speaks of factions being 'co-operative' and 'friendly'. On an observational level, Lewis is eminently correct; kin groupings indeed do co-operate in social and ritual activities and social life in- a village is articulated in terms of such co-operation. The difference arises on an analytical plane when such kin and familial groupings are labeled as 'factions' instead of letting them be known for what they obviously are. On an analytical plane it is a different proposition to state that such kin groupings among their other functions provide personnel (to the factions) in situations of factional strife from the proposition that such familial-cum-kin groupings are *themselves* factions. On empirical plane the position of Lewis amounts to this: that kinship which *ipso facto* implies sub-caste plays a crucial part in the recruitment of personnel to the factions. But as shown in numerous studies quoted in this paper, an interest orientation is mostly on the fore and factions may as well be multi-caste in composition.

Detachment of conflict element as a unit of definition from the term gives rise to a basic discrepancy in Lewis own use of the term in the peasant cultures of Ranikhera and Tepoztlan (1955). In Mexican village 'factions are political groupings rather than kinship groupings' and that 'brothers may be members of hostile and opposed factions'. If that is so, then what does the term stand for? What is its content? Further, we are told that factions are fewer in number, 'only two as a rule'. If factions are 'only two as a rule' and that brothers may be members of 'hostile and opposed factions', then does it not follow from the juxtaposition of these two observations that opprobrious relations are central to their formation and functioning? The ostensible contradiction here cannot be resolved without being false to empirical observations. But the contradiction is more apparent than real. It inheres in the conceptual error regarding the nature of factional process and the consequent misconception concerning the use of the term faction.

Recruitment of Personnel

Recruitment of personnel to factions is seen to follow primarily two directionalities. One of these may be termed *situational* and the other *structural*. They are, however, not mutually exclusive and may indeed be complementary in many cases. The distinction is analytic. Implicit within both of them is the participating individual's interest orientation.

Situational modality refers to certain overt features of a faction situation. In particular it refers to such a web of circumstances on the confrontation of which social actor has to act. The split in communist parties today along pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions is patently owing to the differing convictions of the members concerning the ways to bring about communist revolution in the world. The split among Baathists in Iraq in 1963 along the extremist and moderate factions was over such issues as immediate socialization *vs.* a gradual progress towards the goal, rabid anti-Nasser attitude *vs.* a more tolerant approach etc.[1] Formation and emergence of sects in the Church illustrates much of the same facet. Obviously the ranging of individual along these antithetical positions has as much to do with the character of issues as with other factors. Factions may arise and persons may join them because of their feelings about the rightness and wrongness of matters.

Perception of self-interest impels the individuals powerfully to chart out their paths in encounter with the situational pressures. Low

20

caste individuals in a village may align themselves with the patron who benefits them most. For the same purpose individuals may cross factional sides. In the State Legislatures in India, instances have not been lacking when some so-called 'dissidents' or members of the minority faction within the ruling party have changed loyalty to align themselves with the dominant side. Likewise some members of the dominant group whose expectations were not realized, have not hesitated *to* switch over to minority faction in anticipation of future course of events. Factions within Trade Union betray much the same facet. Individuals belonging to particular occupational categories may band together and the factions so formed exercise devious pressures for securing differential benefits during the course of negotiations with employers. This is why it sometimes proves difficult to get the decisions reached in a settlement ratified within the union and the labour leaders may thus lay themselves open to the charges of insincerity and double dealing (Stagner 1950: 371-73). Situational contexts of interest conflict may among others be provided by a piece of land, boundary between fields, irrigation-facilities, positions of importance in organizational hierarchy, pursuit of differential advantages etc. In such instances individuals form or join factions in terms of their self-interest.

Structural modality refers to the consideration of such facts of social structure as may have bearing upon the membership of factional groupings. This modality does not exclude the interest-orientation and may indeed be co-extensive with it. Ties of kinship, patron-client relationship, friendship, cultural, communal or regional group solidarity, reciprocal patterns of obligation are some of the structural elements that define membership situations in many factional scenes.

Participation in a faction has also to do with an individual's ties with other socii. In a crisis situation his support may be demanded by those with whom he is closely aligned in the network of social relationship. Conversely he may himself have to ask for support in similar situations. The pattern of reciprocity of obligation is concerned with an individual's sense of fear that if he backs *out* from involvement, he himself may be left without support in cases where his own quarrels may not be amicably settled. Clients support their patrons out of a sense of obligation and loyalty for benefits derived in the past and anticipation of advantages in the future. Friendly kin, caste or community members may be drawn into factional vortex in order to preserve solidarity, provided they themselves are. not rent with factional strife.   Mayer (1961: 135-138)

21

has dealt with these aspects in his discussion of factions among Fiji Indians. In Brahminpura, dominant caste members traditionally preserved solidarity amongst themselves but owing to impact of new politico-economic forces, intra-caste factions are seen in the process of forming (Rastogi: 1963). The implication here is that recruitment of individuals to factions in such cases may be more in terms of structural ties and less in terms of the issues themselves.

An example of intense factional activity in which structural and interest considerations interlace is provided by Pathan Social Organization (Barth: 1959). A Pathan is "structurally" ranged into opposition against his patrilineal cousins who stand to inherit his share of land in case of his death and *vice versa.* Land is a highly capitalized scarce resource and a most important source of status for its possessor. Disputes over field boundaries and irrigation rights often flare up into violence and "the enemies of one's enemy" are regarded as one's natural friend. The alliances are forged in terms of factional strategy and parallel theory of games consideration. Another interesting case in Eastern U.P. has been studied by the author. Here what was originally a conflict over property between two Brahmin families a generation ago, now encompasses four nearby villages. Besides Brahmins and their low caste clients, the factional chasm has engulfed the Ahirs to whom the Brahmin families act as priests. Ahirs, a martial caste of cattle breeders and milk-vendors were called upon for help by the respective antagonistic priestly households by an appeal to theor *jajmani* ties. This led to the formation of factions among Ahirs themselves. Today one finds there a dichotomous factional complex to accomplish the humiliation of their opponents. The point here is that the recruitment of Ahirs to respective factions is seen to be governed singularly by *guru-shishya* relationship which is an important structural feature of Hindu social organization. For otherwise, Ahirs are relatively Well-to-do and under no obligation of economic clientship to Brahmins. (Rastogi: 1965). Social beings apparently take advantage of the existing structural principles of their society in the formation of alliances for their objectives.

Feuds and Factions

Feud as a type of conflict would appear to betray' some similarities with a virulent form of factionalism, i.e. one in which violence is involved. Both processes are also apparently concerned with group aspects. Hence an analytic distinction between the two appears necessary. The existence of feuds has been noted extensively among Corsicans, Sardinians, Teutonic Tribes, Arabs, Pathan and some Afri-

22

can societies. It originates primarily in the case of homicide and the near kins of the murdered man have the right of revenge.[2] Accordingly it signifies a state of deep hostilities between the two families,, kin groups, clans or even tribes. As such a feud may be said to parallel a factional conflict where the vengeance for homicide is Involved and which may issue into a vendetta.

The main analytic distinction in this context however is that feud as a form of conflict is associated with *custom* whereas factionalism is not. As pointed out by Lucy Mair 'a feud is not any kind of quarrel but the *special* hostile relationship with its *recognized rules* which a homicide creates . . . . between the *kin* of the killer and those of the victim" (italics inserted). She further adds that "the term feud is not applicable in societies where vengeance is not the *duty* of a *defined* social group" (1963: 25). This apparently is not the case with factionalism where interest orientation' and not duty orientation' may predominate.

Another important analytic distinction is that in case of feud there are well-defined and established modalities of settlement through compensation or *wergild* which eventuate into a formal ritual reconciliation of the two warring groups. Factionalism on the other hand is an *unregulated* or *unresolved* type of conflict lacking in such customary modalities. In feud, fighting is a means of seeking redress in a wenSrecognized and *socially sanctioned* manner and a feud can be terminated by the payment of a compensation whereby a homicide is deemed to have been atoned. Not so with factionalism. Here under the impact of provocations, bitterness may continue to deepen and the conflict may acquire a gathering momentum of its own. There is here no corresponding mechanism similar to "the peace in {he feud" whereby the pressure of conflicting loyalties in the vengeance group engenders the settlement of disputes (Gluckman: 1955).

The above two distinguishing characteristic serve to differentiate the feud from the factional conflict.

Foci *of Structuration*

As stated at the beginning, faction situations may be deemed to be isomorphic. Their emergence, growth, persistence and settings may be diverse yet they may be perceived to betray an inherent similarity of structure. This follows *qua* their being *factional* in nature. Below] ate sought to be delineated certain foci of their structuration.

Some of the ground in this context would however be found to have been already covered.

1. A faction situation is primarily structured in terms of an issue or issues that give rise to dissension. This issue or point of division may be based "On some objective clash of interest or may presage such a conflict. Factions develop around key-individuals in a social system and *clash of interest* (including status-rivalry) between them sets the process in motion. Subsequent fashioning of the situation is apt to be determined in a significant manner by this original phase of contention. The settings may be various and varied. Factionalism in trade unions revolves round such issues as system of wages, types of security benefits, seniority criterion etc. which differentially favour various categories of workers in an industrial establishment (Stagner: 1956). Factionalism in villages may be over seats in the ministry or other offices of profit. Similarly factionalism in Indian mass organisations like banks, business houses and even universities may form around giving jobs to one's own castemen and in such instances the process may be superposed with an invidious pattern of casteism.[3]

Whatever may be the issues in terms of which the situation is structured, the opposition of interests is usually objective and the conflict is 'realistic' (Simrnel). But there may also conceivably arise situations in which the issue is characterised by an encounter over prestige considerations or status-rivalry. Here the objective material aspects of dispute taken by themselves may be insignificant. Conflict between an old established landlord household and the family of a *navoux riches* in a village may possibly provide situation coming under this category (Zaidi, 1962.- 26). Many of the murders committed in the village of Unnao, Hardoi, Shajahanpur and Rampur districts of U.P. in the wake of virulent factional conflict are over the so-called considerations of *aan* or *tek* which in translation means vindication of honour or similar rigid postures of prestige. Here, however, the original issues may involve 'realistic' conflict.

Doctrinal disputes concerning theological or ideological positions provide other instances in which the structuring issue may originally be one of 'non-realistic' conflict. But, as mentioned earlier such issues may presage a 'realistic' conflict. Power is heavily involved in these disputes. A concession on a doctrinal issue automatically magnifies the power and strengthens the prestige and even authority of one protagonist at the expense of the other. Thus surface doctrinal disagreements may provide cover for a factional struggle for power in doctrinally oriented organisations like Church or Communist move-

24

ment. A charge of doctrinal laxity or some other similar imperfection in such cases is apt to provide an impetus to factional turbulence.

2.   Another singular characteristic of a faction situation may be designated as the *perceptual setting of interest closure.*   It involves a psycho-social dimension concerning the perception of the situation by the rival   socii.   This setting of closure may be fancied or real. It essentially implies that the amount of value or material benefits is limited and accordingly one's gain is perceived to take place only at the cost of another's loss.   The closure inheres in the perception that if the other section benefits this entails corresponding deprivation for one's own set.   This aspect is obvious in land disputes where the advantage of one means the disadvantage of the other. Similarly, in the wranglings within a ruling political party, the offices of profit being limited, factional rivalries get sharpened. The struggle for power between two or more factions in organisational settings evidently under-scores this aspect.   The success of one means the loss or eclipse of the other, momentarily at least.   Within the framework of this closure, bitterness generated in contests would appear to be directly proportional to the degree of ego-involvement of the parties in the goals or objectives sought.

3.   A faction situation is ostensibly also characterised by a *cessation of cooperative activities* among the persons belonging *to* opposed factions.   This aspect is apparently so important that Siegel and Beals have incorporated it as a part into their definition of factionalism (ibid.).   It is regarded as a crucial characteristic in the identification of the phenomenon.   In a united group or community, members cooperate with each other in various common endeavours but as the group fissions off into factions, these common cooperative activities tend to cease.

Conflict and antagonism signify a breakdown or attenuation of communication process. This diminution of communication and increase of social distance is reflected in the lack of cooperative activities between the group members. The disputes even over trifles become too frequent. Agreement over even minor details is often not forthcoming with the result that the affair is often given up in disgust. Beals' study of Namhali and Siegel's of Taos Pueblo exemplify this aspect (ibid). Mayers' account of factionalism in an Indian village in Fiji and author's in an U.P. village where Ram Lila could not be arranged cooperatively, also illustrates the same (1964: 132-135). In Epstein's study, conflict over performance of ritual in honour of the

village Goddess in a South Indian village and disappearance of certain common ceremonies from another, also point to the same aspect (1962: 129-140 and 284-290). Absence of cooperative endeavours in communal or collective enterprises not only signifies the presence of factionalism but also apparently appears to be directly related to lesser or greater degree of it. This facet structures a faction situation in terms of according it a measure of stabilisation.

4. Another distinctive mark of a faction situation as distinguished from other conflict types is that here there is *agreement over the superordinate goals* embraced by the group. Conflict is usually over the modalities of their attainment. Factions are articulated in terms of this disagreement. Although factions are recognised and may function as such, their existence is deplored as being detrimental to the group cause. They are justified *per se* not as something that ought to be there but rather because 'justice' and 'right things' are not being done. Hence factions are almost never recognised as parts of the 'official' social structure of a group, association or community by their members (the social structure here being regarded as the *ideal* pattern of social relations in a society). Rather they point to the character of social organisation as it exists in the actual functioning of everyday social life; the social organisation here signifying the way things get done over time *in* the community. This distinction along the lines of social structure and social organisation has been perceptively pointed out by Firth and under-scored by Redfield in his study of Chan Kom (Firth; 1961: 211-212) 'Factions do not exist in the expectations of people as something that ought to be there' (Redfield; 1958: 41).

Fundamental aims or values are seldom parts of dispute in a faction situation. Conflict is between 'dogmatists' and 'revisionists' among the Communists; not over the basic goals of Communist movement. Conflict within a trade union is never over the aims i.e. the welfare of workers, but only over how best to bring it about so that there is benefit for every pressure group. Village factions name each other for vitiating the ideals of village unity. 'Dissidents' in a political party may not disagree with the majority group over the party's programme or aims but only over the issue that the latter is not doing enough to carry it out or some other peripheral matters. Similarly in doctrinally oriented organisation, the factional struggle may centre over the 'purity' or the 'interpretation' of the doctrine and not over the basic ideological understructure.

Accordingly a faction situation is uniquely shaped in *terms* of

26

this basic consensus and consequent peripheral disjunctions which have to do with the interest orientations of the socii.

5. Factionalism is an overt type of conflict carried-on a manifest level. Factional groups are aware of each other's presence, often painfully so. Their activities are accordingly conditioned to a significant extent by what each of them does. This aspect provides another important element in the structuring of a faction situation. A *factional strategy* in terms of which antagonists counter each other's moves, judge and decide issues, is a basic part thereof. The nature of this strategy depends upon the types of interest over which the clash occurs, the nature of information at their disposal and their perception of the events. An issue in such a context is not adjudged on its merit but rather in terms of the total strategy of factional alliances, committals and antagonism. If a group proposes some measure or stands to benefit by it even in a minor degree, then the other group thinks it to be incumbent upon itself to frustrate such a move. There is no objective content evaluation. It is mainly owing to this aspect of faction situation that the efforts of block development authorities in India to initiate developmental ventures often meet with active discouragement. If the cooperation of one group is sought, the other automatically turns against it Zaidi reports cases of the same type in Pakistan (ibid).

Consideration of strategy may embrace the whole gamut of alignments, defections, recruitments, detachments (of persons from the other side) and assignment of personnel in the field of factional endeavours.

6. Another structuring characteristics is psychological. A faction situation generates in its wake psychological tensions which are apt to persist even after the immediate context of factional strife may have been obviated. Feelings of antagonism, rancour and bitterness created during such a struggle may lead to the continuance of the faction situation sometimes for surprisingly long periods. Any and every issue in such a case may serve as grist to the mills of factionalism. Factions in such a state of affairs are activated intermittently. They remain dormant for a period after an issue has subsided but get activated again as soon as another point of contention appears on the scene. Depending upon the degree of bitterness and hatred generated, clashing parties remain on the lookout for and seize every opportunity to humble their opponents.

The psychological pressure to humiliate and bring to knees the

27

rival party operates incessantly. Each sees the climbing down by the other in terms of abject apology and surrender as a prerequisite to the restoration of prior solidarity. In author's investigation of factionalism in Panditpur village network, the most recurrent expression in vernacular used by the faction leaders in interview was, *'Ui hamare god par gir pare',* literally, 'they fell on our feet', when the author queried them about the settlement of some previous disputes between them (Rastogi: 1964: ibid). When his psychological pressure continues to build up in absence of suitable opportunities to let off the steam, an explosion point may be reached and violence is apt to erupt. Many so called 'prestige' issues and differences over matters of 'principle' in organisational settings may also be viewed in this perspective.

These psychological dimensions of faction situation provide it with a momentum which assist in its continuance. Evolution of factions as groups with separate identities has obviously much to do with this psychological facet. Instances such as a recent trade union clash in Ceylon may illustrate the cases in point[4].

7. Last but not the least important structural focus is provided by the *unregulated* or *unresolved* nature of factional conflict. This aspect is quite distinctive from other conflict types. A competition is regulated by the rules thereof, a duel takes place in terms of convention, a feud is settled by custom and a war is ended through treaty, defeat, or victory. But not so with factionalism. Here there are no specific 'rules of he game'. Factional schism at Taos Pueblo between the established conservative political hierarchy and innovative younger generation provides a case in point (Fenton: 1957). Absence of well established and customary avenues of settlement makes for the unregulated or unresolved character of the conflict. The latter in a sense undergirds the concomitant psychological tensions who in their turn make for the continuance of the situation.

The foci delineated here are not disparate. They possess critical linkages with each other and it is in their mutual inter-relation that the integral character of the situation may be discerned. In the accompanying diagram an attempt has been made to portray the differentially articulated yet homologous pattern of this class of phenomenon.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, implications follow for the instances where factionalism does not and would not develop. The major

28

focus in the situational context is the clash of interest between key-men in the social system which when unresolved fosters into this form of conflict. Other focii of a faction situation follow rather than precede it. Accordingly *wherever there are effective institutional or quasi-institutional arrangements for the regulation of intra-group dissensions, factionalism would not develop.* It is likely to emerge where such arrangements have broken down owing to impact of social change.

Eradication of factional conflict would here imply an unstructuring of the integrally constituted situation. In formal terms, it would indicate the adoption of modalities for the dismantling of its architecture. In so far as this can be effected, a faction situation would not *form,* although tensions may be present in a diffused form. This follows from the critical linkages between the foci of structuration in the patterning of a faction situation. In diverse types of group settings various built-in mechanisms for the regulation of conflict or the so-called 'safety valve' mechanisms are found. Thus among Kipsigis for example certain statuses exist that serve to resolve sectional conflict through ritual, social mediation, emphasis on common values and manipulation of public opinion (Peristiany: 1956). Other mechanisms may variously be in the form of prestigious or authoritative leadership, institutionalized and routinised procedures, jural devices or some traditional roles which secure the function of insulating the conflict.

Factionalism in Indian villages has became intensified since the onset of steps like zamindari abolition, adult suffrage, panchayati raj and a growing political consciousness owing to incessant propaganda by political parties. These have led to a sharp decline in the prestige and power of zamindars on the one hand and traditional caste leaders on the other. These two modes of leadership between them formerly arbitrated in most of the cases of dispute within a 'village. Now it is no longer so and the tensions escalate. Similarly with the disappearance of charismatic leadership many a well knit social, religious and political movements have been seen to develop factional schisms which often eventuate into radical separations. An effective authority structure enables the political parties, trade unions and other formal organisations to dispose off the potentially disruptive situations in a manner which offsets their escalation.

This concludes our somewhat brief and necessarily inadequate discussion. The faci of structuration outlined here offer a concep-

tual apparatus in terms of which this form of conflict may be circumscribed. Taking the present vantage point, it is possible to demonstrate the congruency of diverse types of faction situations. An identical but differentially articulated homologous pattern underlying them may be discerned. The foci further provides a set of bases which may evolute into a paradigm in terms of which concrete cases may be investigated on an operational level. Situations in comparable and dissimilar settings may be tackled in a comparative manner and generalisations evolved. The latter may in their turn enable us to metricize the variables. In this way we may be moving toward a more adequate comprehension of this dynamic phenomenon and perhaps its control.

NOTES

1., Baath party (Arab Socialists) came to power in Iraq in February 1963 after a violent coup against the regime of General Kassem. Two factions developed *in* the party—'moderates' and 'radicals'. After some bitter wrangling over the latter's anti-Nasser line and advocacy of immediate socialisation, leader of the latter Ali Salah al Saadi, whose alleged 'bloody and vulgar' ways had also alienated many, was expelled from the Government. This situation erupted into violence between the supporters of Saadi (National Guards) and the faction headed by the Talig Shabib which had become dominant owing to the deflection of army's strong man Saleh Mahdi Ammash from Saadi's side to moderates. After this unsuccessful bid, Saadi together with his four main political supporters were exiled. While in exile, within four days, his supporters and sympathisers within the country from Syria gained an upper hand and the situation became fluid. In such a state of affairs, President Aref staged with the help of certain army elements, a pro-Nasser coup on November 18. Much of the current political activity in Middle East is articulated in terms of a power struggle between pro-Nasser and anti-Nasser factions. The struggle is often violent with army elements providing active support to rival factions.

2. Feuds may also extend to such offences as the abduction of women, adultery and gross violation of honour.

3. In such cases, factionalism and casteism to a significant extent go together. The issues more often than not are concerned with jobs, promotions and other types of material gains. The author has come across this pattern in two big banking organisations in Kanpur City. A recent article 'Caste Politics In Education' in Hindustan Times (9-1-64) throws light on this pattern in the educational institutions and universities of Bihar. The phenomenon is in a sense fairly widespread.

4. "Colombo December 18: The Bitter Feud between followers of Moscow and Peking in the hundred thousand Strong Communist Trade Union Federation erupted into a bloody clash at its sixteenth annual session today. Fifteen persons were injured and a car was completely smashed". Thus reads a P.T.I. news item in *The Times of India* dated 20th December 1963. It concludes with mentioning a decision by the pro-Moscow group to convene a *separate* annual session of the Federation in future (italics inserted).

30

REFERENCE CITED

Barth, Frederick   1959   Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization.   Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 89: 5-21.

Brzezinski   1963   How to *Control* a Deviation. Encounter 21: 77-79.

Dube, S. C.   1958   India's Changing Villages. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Epstein, T. S.   1962   Economic Development and Social Change in South India, Oxford University Press.

Fenton. W. N.   1957   Factionalism at Taos Pueblo Mexico, Washington, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology. Anthropological paper No. 56.

Firth, Raymond   1951   Elements of Social Organization. London, Watts & Co.
1957   Factors in India and Overseas Dependencies. British Journal of Sociology 8: 291-94.

Gluckman, Max   1955   Custom and Conflict in Africa, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Harper, Edward B. and Louis G.   1960   Political Organization and Leadership in a Karnatak village, in Leadership and Political Institutions in India. R. Park and I. Tinker Eds. Madias Oxford University Press.

Hampel, C. G.   1952   Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Sciences. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Lasswell, H. D.   1931   Factions, in Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. VI: 49-50.

Lewis, Oscar   1954   Group Dynamics in a North Indian Village, New Delhi.
1955   Peasant Culture in India and Mexico: A Comparative Analysis. American Anthropologist 57: 145-170.

Mair, Lucy   1963   Some Current Terms in Social Anthropology. British Journal of Sociology 14: 20-29.

Mayer, A. C.   1961   Peasants in the Pacific. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

McCormack, William   1960   Factionalism in a Mysore village, in Leadership and Political Institutions in India. R. Park and I. Tinker Eds. Madras Oxford University Press.

Peristiany, J. G.   1956   Law, in The Institutions of Primitive Society. Glencoe, The Free Press.

Rastogi, P. N.   1963   Faction Situation at Brahminpura. Man in India 43: 328-336. 1965   The Evolution of Schisms & Tensions at Panditpur. Unpublished Mss.
1964   Factionalism, Politics and Crime in a U.P. Village, The Eastern Anthropologist.

Redfield, R.   1958   The Little Community. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. 4th impression.

Sharma, K. N. 1963 Panchayat Leadership and Resource Groups, Sociological Bulletin 12: 47-52.

Siegel, B. and
Beals A. 1960 Pervasive Factionalism. American Anthropologist 62: 394-417.

1960 Conflict and Factionalist Dispute. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 90: 107-117.

Singh, Yogendra 1959 Group Status of Factions in Rural Community. Journal of Social Sciences 2: 57-68.

Stagner, Ross 1956 Psychology of Industrial Conflict. New York, John Wiley and Sons. Inc.

Zaidi, S. M. 1962 Brief Case Studies of Village Factions. Journal of the East Pakistan Academy for Village Development 3: 26-36.