## MPhil

## Semester-II

## Paper: Eco-121

## Advanced Micro Economics: Theory and Applications

## Group-B

## Lecture-I

## NORMAL FORM GAMES AND EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

## Strategic Games

A strategic game is a model of interactive decision-making in which each decision-making in which each decision maker hoses his plan of action once and for all, and these choices are made simultaneously. The model consists of a finite set $N$ of players and, for each player $i$, a set $\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{i}}$ of actions and a preference relation on the set of action profiles. We refer to an action profile $a=\left(a_{j}\right)_{j \varepsilon N}$ as an outcome, and denote the set $X_{j \in N} A_{j}$ of outcomes by A. The requirement that the preferences of each player $i$ be defined over $A$, rather that $A_{i}$ is the feature that distinguishes a strategic game from a decision problem: each player may care not only about his own action but also about the actions taken by the other players.

## Definition:

A strategic game consists of:
$>$ A finite set N (the set of players)
$>$ For each player $i \varepsilon N$ a non-empty set $A_{i}($ the set of actions available to player $i)$
$>$ For each player $i \varepsilon N$ a preference relation $\geq i$ on $\mathrm{A}, A=X_{j \varepsilon N} A_{j}$ (the preference relation of player $i$ )

If the set of $\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{i}}$ of actions of every player $i$ is finite then the game is finite.

A finite strategic game in which there are two players can be described conveniently in a table like that in figure-1.

|  | $\mathbf{L}$ | $\mathbf{R}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{T}$ | $\mathrm{W}_{1}, \mathrm{~W}_{2}$ | $\mathrm{X}_{1}, \mathrm{X}_{2}$ |
|  | $\mathrm{Y}_{1}, \mathrm{Y}_{2}$ | $\mathrm{Z}_{1}, \mathrm{Z}_{2}$ |
|  |  |  |

Figure-1
One player's actions are identified with the row and other player's with the columns. The two numbers in the box formed by row r and columns c are the player's payoffs when the row player chooses $r$ and the column player chooses c , the first component being the payoff of the row player. Thus in the game in figure- 1 the set of actions of the row player is $\{T, B\}$ and that of the column player is $\{L, R\}$ and for example the row player's payoff from the outcome $(T, L)$ is $W_{1}$ and the column player's payoff is $W_{2}$. If the players' names are " 1 " and " 2 " then convention is that the row player is Player-1 and the column player is Player-2.

Ref: A Course in Game Theory: Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein

